Voting by Committees under Constraints

provided by Research Papers in Economics

Voting by Committees under Constraints*

by

Salvador Barberd^t, Jordi Massd^tt, and Alejandro Neme^§

October 2001

abstract: We consider social choice problems where a society must choose
a subset from a set of objects. Specihcally, we characterize the families of
strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are
feasible, and voters’ preferences are separable or additively represent able.

Journal of Economic Literature Classihcation Number: D7.

Keywords-. Voting, Strategy-proofness, Additive and Separable Preferences.

*Wc arc grateful to Dolors Bcrga for helpful comments. The work of S. Barbcrà and J.
Masso is partially supported by Research Grants PB98-0870 from the Spanish Ministry of
Education and Culture, and 2000SGR-00054 from the Gcncralitat de Catalunya. The pa-
per was partially written while Jordi Masso was visiting the Department- of Economics at
the Univcrsidad Carlos III de Madrid (Spain) under a sabbatical fellowship from the Gcn-
Cralitat de Catalunya and the IMASL at the Univcrsidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina)
under a sabbatical fellowship from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture.

tDcpartamcnt d’Economia i d’Historia Economica and CODE. Univcrsitat Autonoma
de Barcelona. 08193, Bcllatcrra (Barcelona), Spain. E-mails: [email protected]
and [email protected].

Author to whom the editorial communication should be sent.

“Institute de Matcmatica Aplicada. Univcrsidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET.
Ejcrcito de Ios Andes 950. 5700, San Luis, Argentina. E-mail: ancmc<hunsl.cdu.ar.

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