or anything else is codified and whether this involves some condensation of the
original material. It splits into two parts:
1. know-that representations - usually these hold factual knowledge or data,
and typically are the subject of information theory,
2. and know-how representations - usually these hold inference knowledge
in the form of programs and languages, and typically are the subject of
instruction theory.
For animals, as opposed to machines, representation again means the codified
form of knowledge and data; again it splits into two parts: know-that representa-
tions which are stores of encyclopedic knowledge, and know-how representations
which are essentially skills that can be deployed. Stereotyping loosely means col-
lating information into a labeled set or template which can be readily (re-)used;
properly this is cognitive stereotyping as opposed to social stereotyping, Stewart
et al (1979) [45]. Examples of this are actions such as walking; an example which
allows quantitative measurements is memory chunking, the existence of which
has been readily demonstrated by many experiments. Name strategy means
associating a given word with a stereotype. This splits into two types:
1. where the word activates a switch, the switch is perhaps innate, another
example of a switch is pro-drop in linguistics,
2. where there is no switch.
The paradigmatic, and best studied, example of the first of these is colour
name strategy; in which the focal colours are progressively labeled by names
as a culture advances until all eleven are named. Object name strategy is
an example of the second. The purpose of the present paper is to describe
the empirical justification for these representations and their implications for
psychology, philosophy, and mathematics.
1.2 Diagram
1.3 Sectional Contents
§1 establishes a framework which allows discussion of the nature of representa-
tions; it is advocated that there is minimal duplication of these. The existence
of colour name strategy is discussed in §2. The similarity of the idea of adopt-
ing a name strategy and creating a representation discussed in §1.4. Colour
name strategy is taken to be the paradigmatic case of stereotyping and the re-
lationships of ob ject name strategy and chunking to it are discussed in §3 and
§4 respectively. Whenever colour name strategy is deployed it illustrates that
thought can exist without words and in principle allows a qualitative measure of
this. In §5 it is noted that the Berlin-Kay universal partial ordering for colours
is similar to the frequency that traffic accidents occur for a car of a given colour.
§7 continues, from Roberts (1998) [36], my approach to radical interpretation.