How does what is here called a stereotype compare to other representations?
Semantic representations, Shannon (1988) [42], are essentially codified and con-
densed information which is meant to encompass the ”meaning” of a portion of
language. Shannon argues that they are not a primary structure, this suggests
that there is no switching and meaning (in the form of semantic representations)
is stored in a similar way to ob ject perception. Way (1991) [49] allows knowl-
edge representations to be general enough to include metaphor. At this point
what a representation is becomes entangled with what meaning is. My view is
that “meaning” is too general and nebulous a term to pin down in this way,
aspects of ”meaning” must be involved in colour name strategy, the best thing
to do is classify aspects of meaning and see what sort of representation they
entail. Visual perception entails perceiving objects, and so contains object per-
ception as discussed in §3; Farah (1988) [12] discusses whether visual imagery
engages some of the same representations as used in visual perception. She
finds neuropsychological evidence which suggests that some representations are
used for both purposes. This dual purpose or multiuse of visual representations
is similar to the multiuse of names in name strategy. Irrespective of whether
representations are innate, the variety of use to which a given representation
can be put suggests that there are general principles involving the creation and
operation of representations.
1.5 Minimal Duplication of Resources
Why do nervous systems in animals produce representations? An answer is that
by holding a representation an animal does not have to do the same processing of
information again and again. Indeed repeated information processing might be
the method by which many representations are created; for example Jeannerod
(1994) [22] repeated actions seem to improve motor control, in the words of
Decety et al (1994) [9]
”Mental practice involves rehearsal of neural pathways related to
cognitive stages of motor control.”
Other examples which suggest that the representations used in imagination are
the same as those received externally are:
1. the dual visual representations discussed by Farah (1988) [12], see the
previous §1.4,
2. and the combined use of visual and auditory imagery when reading to
oneself.
The principle of minimum duplication stands in stark contrast to the ideas of
modularity where for example there is no visual and auditory interaction until
the information reaches the ”cognitive center”. Strict modularity is in any case
unlikely for many reasons, three of which are:
1. the interaction of seeing and hearing words McGurk and McDonald (1976)
[30],