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know well, O Zarathustra, who you are and must become: behold, you are the teacher
of the eternal recurrence - that is your destiny!” Here, as in the other words that they
address to Zarathustra in this section, the animals act as an audience or constituency
for Zarathustra, showing that, of all the living beings addressed in this narrative, they
are the only ones who may truly be said to understand what he teaches. This may seem
trivial to some - what are animals, compared to humans, as far as comprising an audi-
ence or ‘public’ is concerned? But if one keeps in mind that all the figures invented in
this text have interrelated symbolic meanings and significance, it is not inconsequen-
tial that the animals have understood him (even if, judging by Zarathustra's responses
in this section, they may be seen as ‘echoing’ him to a certain degree), in this way con-
firming his distinctive cultural (prophetic, educational) function. After all, if
Zarathustra is at pains to bring humans the news that they must learn to love the earth
because God is dead, it is hardly surprising that beings that are close to the earth, with-
out any religious or metaphysical illusions - animals - are the ones who ‘show under-
standing’ in this narrative, in contrast to the people he addresses (even the ‘higher
men’, who show glimpses of understanding from time to time, then regress in this re-
spect).
I would suggest, then, that his listening, talking ‘animals’ may be read as metaphori-
cally representing receptive human beings who are attuned to the message that Nietz-
sche is bringing via the figure of Zarathustra. By using the figure of ‘animals’ Nietz-
sche intimates that an important prerequisite for ‘understanding’ him is to remember
that humans are animals of a certain type, who have largely forgotten that they are
such, and therefore tend to neglect or disregard those attributes (‘instincts’, drives, and
so on) which they share with ‘real’ animals, and that connect them with the earth. Be-
ings such as ‘real’ animals have no choice in the matter; they live instinctively in ac-
cordance with the Dionysian cycle of birth, growth, decay and resurrection (of the spe-
cies). The important point that this section illustrates, I believe, is that Nietzsche is not
completely sceptical (or pessimistic) - as he sometimes appears - about the prospects
of having an ‘audience’ or public that would confirm his creative, inventive contribu-
tion to philosophy, and therefore to culture.18
I conclude this paper with an excerpt from The Will to Power (1032; 1968: 532-533)
which captures, succinctly (if implicitly), much of what I have argued:
If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all exis-
tence. For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if
our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once,
all eternity was needed to produce this one event - and in this single moment of
affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed.19
18 One final observation on this issue: the very fact that Nietzsche wrote in an extant language, and went to
certain undeniable lengths to have his writings published, is a performative confirmation of his desire
for, and implicit belief in the possibility of, an audience, readership or interpretive community.
19 Compare this passage with a formulation of the same thought in ‘The drunken song’ (10,
Part 4; 1984: 435), in Thus spoke Zarathustra. Needless to say, in Nietzsche's use of the term ‘eternity’,
its meaning differs fundamentally from that which it bears in antiquity and the middle ages, namely
‘timelessness’ or the absence of time - this much should be evident already from Copjec's discussion of
immortality, addressed at the beginning of this paper. For Nietzsche, by contrast with the ancient and