62
G. Riva, M.T. Anguera, B.K. Wiederhold and F. Mantovani (Eds.)
From Communication to Presence: Cognition, Emotions and Culture towards the
Ultimate Communicative Experience. Festschrift in honor of Luigi Anolli
IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, (c) All rights reserved - http://www.emergingcommunication.com
observer’s understanding of the action require him to understand the agent’s
communicative intention (because the agent has none).” (pp. 22-23).
Another criticism related to this approach is the limited role of imitation in our
interpersonal relationships [71]: imitation is not a very common response to watching
other people. Indeed, Baldissera and colleagues [72] found evidence of spinal
“inverted mirror” behavior: structures in the spinal cord specifically inhibit undesired
imitative action.
3.4.3 Imitation in Social Cognition
As we have seen, one of the main criticisms to the Embodied Simulation approach is
that mirror neurons alone are not enough to provide the richness required for
representing a subject’s social intention. But what are the main features of human
social cognition?
According to Tomasello and colleagues [73, 74] it is possible to identify three
different levels of social understanding:
- Perception of the behavior of animate beings: this level allow the subject to
predict the consequences of the observed behavior. In particular this level allows
for both Motor Empathy - the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize
facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another
person - and Emotional Empathy - the response to the emotional displays of
others [75];
- Understanding that others’ behavior is goal-directed: on this level, other
individuals are conceived of as intentional agents whose behavior and attention
are purposive.
- Theory of Mind (ToM): on this level, other individuals are conceived of as
agents whose thoughts and beliefs may differ from those directly inferred from
their perceived behavior. This level allows Cognitive Empathy, the ability to
represent the mental states of others, i.e., their thoughts, desires, beliefs,
intentions, and knowledge.
Apparently, mirror neurons have a critical role in the first level only. So, what is
missing is an explanation for how a neural mirror system begets a theory of mind.
According to Meltzoff and colleagues [76-80], the starting point for such an
explanation is the imitation process.
Meltzoff, in his thirty-year-long research about infant imitation, found that
newborns - even only 42 minutes old - demonstrate successful facial imitation.
Moreover he found that 12-21-day-old infants can imitate four different adult
gestures: lip protrusion, mouth opening, tongue protrusion and finger movement.
Interestingly, the newborns’ first response to seeing a facial gesture is the activation
of the corresponding body part [77]: apparently young infants isolate what part of
their body to move before understanding how to move it (organ identification).
The developmental work shows that infants not only imitate but also know when
they are being imitated by others (recognition of goal-directed behavior). However,
data show an important difference between the younger and the older infants [78]:
younger infants increase the particular gesture being imitated, but do not switch to
mismatching gestures to see if they will be copied. Specifically, older infants both
recognize the difference between them and the other, and seem to be exploring the