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G. Riva, M.T. Anguera, B.K. Wiederhold and F. Mantovani (Eds.)
From Communication to Presence: Cognition, Emotions and Culture towards the
Ultimate Communicative Experience. Festschrift in honor of Luigi Anolli
IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, (c) All rights reserved - http://www.emergingcommunication.com
The first assumption is that spatiality is the mode of our existence. In this vision,
humans are not “in” space, but they do exist in some spatially salient manner. So, the
world is mainly a “space-of-action”: the human beings are thrown into situations in
which they must continually act and interpret [3].
Heidegger identifies three main features of this space-of-action [4]: “de-severance”
[Ent-fernung], “directionality” [Ausrichtung] and “regions” [Zuhanden]. De-
severance describes the non contemplative nature of being: it exists through
concretely acting in the world, by reaching for things and going to places. In this
view the being is the result of a process of spatial self-determination, “making things
available” to him/herself. As noted by Arisaka [4]:
“When I walk from my desk area into the kitchen, I am not simply changing locations
from point A to B in an arena-like space, but I am ‘taking in space’ as I move,
continuously making the ‘farness’ of the kitchen ‘vanish,’ as the shifting spatial
perspectives are opened up as I go along.” (p. 37).
This process is always “directional” [4]: aimed toward something or in a certain
direction. The direction is determined by our concern and by specific “regions”. In
fact regions - the office, the park, the kitchen, etc. - are functional for organizing our
activities and contextualizing tools and other beings. Regions are not neutral,
container-like space, but are inherently organized by activities, which determine the
center of action[3]: our spatial activities determine a “here” related to the
objects/beings we deal with. Following this view, “existence” is the main feature of
being: a temporally-structured making intelligible of the place in which we find
ourselves. As delineated by Heidegger [1]:
“[I] t follows that Being-in is not a 'property' which Dasein sometimes has and
sometimes does not have, and without which it could just be just as well as it could
be with it. It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a
relationship-of-Being towards the 'world'--a world with which he provides himself
occasionally.” (p. 84).
To describe this feature of being, Heidegger introduced the concept of “throwness”
[Geworfenheit]: he claims that we are limited, and determined to some extent, by
conditions and circumstances beyond our control. During the life each human being
is “thrown” into existence, into situations in which he/she must continually act and
interpret. In this process a critical role is played by moods, described as a unique and
primary way of disclosing the being-in-the-world, that is prior to the “cognitive”
disclosure [5]. In fact, is not “reason” that gives us our basic access to being, but
moods [1]:
“The disclosure-possibilities of cognition fall very short when compared with the
primordial disclosure that belongs to moods.” (p. 134).
The interaction with objects follows a similar path: when the being is engaged in
purposeful actions, “cognitive” representations of objects as tools or equipment do
not exist. This means that objects are conceived of according to their usefulness in