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G. Riva, M.T. Anguera, B.K. Wiederhold and F. Mantovani (Eds.)
From Communication to Presence: Cognition, Emotions and Culture towards the
Ultimate Communicative Experience. Festschrift in honor of Luigi Anolli
IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006, (c) All rights reserved - http://www.emergingcommunication.com
In summary, in “being-with” we have the possibility of comprehending that we
cannot be selves unless it is within our possibilities to relate in a unique way to other
human beings: we exist not on our own terms, but only in reference to others [7].
3.3. The “Being-in-the-world” for Cognitive Neuroscience
In our capsule view of Heidegger’s work, we discussed the two faces of his concept
of being. On one side, the main features of “being-in-the-world” are spatiality and
throwness. On the other side, the “being-in-the-world-with” is characterized by the
reference to others and solicitude. Further, both sides are ontologically connected in
our existence.
Even if this is a philosophical vision, there are strict links with the more recent
outcomes of cognitive science. In the next paragraphs we will try to outline these
links, starting from the “being-in-the-world”.
3.3.1 Embedded Cognition
A critical part within Heidegger’s reflection is the concept of “throwness”, as
original state in which the being must continually act and interpret.
However, for a long time cognitive science considered action, perception, and
interpretation as separate activities. As provocatively outlined by Prinz [8]:
“We had perception on one side, which is in the business of representing inputs from
the external world. Then we had action, on the other side, which controls an
organism’s outputs, or behavior. Nestled between these “peripheral systems” when
had central systems, which were presumed be the main engines of “cognition” or
“thinking.” Each of these systems was supposed to work independently, like separate
committees in a great corporation, only vaguely away of what the others are up to.
In cogsci lingo, each system was supposed to use proprietary rules and
representations.” (p. 19).
A recent trend in cognitive science is instead seeing cognition as embedded, or
situational. This is a rethinking of the idea that cognition is primarily a matter of
performing formal operations on abstract symbols and has little or nothing to do with
the environment in which it occurs [9]. Countering it, Embedded Cognition takes as
its starting point the idea that cognition occurs in specific environments, and for
specific ends [10-12]. The main approaches related to this trend are Situated
Cognition, Distributed Cognition and Embodied Cognition.
3.3.1.1 Situated and Distributed Cognition
The Situative perspective shifts the focus of analysis from individual activity to
larger systems that include behaving subjects interacting with each other and with
other subsystems in the environment [13].
Within it, the Situated Cognition approach includes a family of research efforts [14-
17] explaining cognition - including problem solving, sense making, understanding,
transfer of learning, creativity, etc. - in terms of the relationship between subjects
(agents) and the properties of specific environments (affordances/constrains). This is