42
30 That is, in Newell’s terms, phenomena covering all of the cognitive band and most of the rational
one.
31 Johnson Laird’s (2003) thesis is that human understanding depends on the construction of mental
models from perception, imagination and the comprehension of language.
32 Moravcsik (1979) has argued that understanding should be seen as the state of mind that yields the
insight that unites one’s knowledge required to arrive at the solution to a problem.
33 The literature on reasoning has not defined its very object of investigation. We therefore feel
justified to use the term in this rather iconoclastic way.
34 Is mathematical validity materialised in the nervous system? My hunch is that it is. It appears that it
only needs the following two basic capabilities to have been neurally materialised: (i) recognition of
identities and differences; and (ii) sense of direction. Concerning the former, it appears that the
existence of neural inhibitions and the hierarchical semantic structures identified in 2.1.1.1 offer a
reasonable ground for the recognition of identities and differences by the individual. Hebb does not
seem to have addressed this issue and I am not aware of relevant literature. My strongest reason for
this suggestion is its reasonableness and the lack of any logical objections to it. With respect to
directionality, I have no better reasons than Hebb’s (1976) and Russell’s (1921) mnemic causation.
35 Part of this complexity, and probably its power, is due to its unconscious nature. We are in full
agreement with Kandel’s (2006, p. 375) remark: “most students of the brain believe, as Freud did, that
we are not conscious of most cognitive processes, only of the end result of those processes.” Gelepithis
(2005) stated a number of factors contributing to the complexity of the process of understanding.
36 Electron is the only one of the four that cannot be placed in P. Moreover, the class of concepts like
electrons which can be placed in P' but not in P is not a singleton. The distinction cannot be swept
away as a single oddity. Nevertheless, one should notice that if we were able to distinguish electrons
we could place ‘electron’ in P (future technology may enable us to do that).
37 For Herbert Simon’s view on cognitive invariants and a critical review of it see Simon (1990) and
Gelepithis (1992) respectively.
38 Within the theory proposed here, chorum sensing (e.g., Williams, et. al. 2007) does not constitute
communication.
39 Even the existence of ‘representation’ has been debated (e.g., Brooks 1991, Kelso 1995 against;
Bechtel 1998, Clark & Toribio 1994 for). Stufflebeam (1998) sits on the fence with a leaning towards
the against side.
40 There is a large number of scientists whose view of ‘representation’ is based on the assumption that
if a structure is regularly and reliably activated by a distal condition then that is adequate reason to
believe that structure as representing the distal condition. This assumption of «receptor representation»
has been effectively criticized by Ramsey (2003).
41 This definition is in accordance with both Aristotle’s (4th BCE*1984) views on poetry and drama as
human endeavours to mimic (i.e., re-present) the essence of human actions and the standard cognitive
science view stated earlier.
42 Some early work on semantic networks attempted to address some of the psychological mechanisms
of thinking but it was soon forgotten and abandoned.
43 Some further interesting similarities and consequences follow that are beyond the scope of this
article.
44 Evidence of writing marks of an expressive and presumed ritualistic nature goes back to about
32kya. Closer to our times geometrical and property markings have been found that have been
interpreted to have been used as devices for reckoning time and for counting. Nevertheless, these
markings are substantially different from even the elements of a writing system since they lack any
sequencing or hint of narrative. They are static and self-contained (Barton & Hamilton 1996). The first
link of visible marks to the original Sumerian cuneiform writing system has come with the work of
Schmandt-Besserat 1978, 1980). Such marks (in the form of tokens) are dated back to ~10kya.
45 Barton & Hamilton (1996) provide an excellent clarification of this relationship and of associated
issues like the language-thought debate and potential evolutionary mechanisms.
46 And so is Chalmers to the extent he accepts their active externalism thesis (Clark & Chalmers
1998*2008).
47 For a recent philosophical discussion see Silverberg (2003).