41
8 Table 1 is a lightly revised version of a similar one in Gelepithis (1988). It does not include new
names for earlier theories (e.g., experience-grounded semantics, conceptual role semantics or model-
theoretic semantics for the TTM, functional role semantics for essentially the use theory of meaning,
or informational semantics for essentially Grice’s theory of natural meaning), since newer theories
have not modified the nature of earlier ones. For a recent technical survey the reader may consult
Wang (2005) and, in particular, the third part (nature of meaning pp.151-389) of Lepore & Smith
(2006).
9 He changed his mind in 1921.
10 Chomsky's Aspects of the theory of Syntax was the last major work in generative linguistics before
the appearance of a fundamental split in transformational-generative grammar. The split concerns the
relationship between syntax and semantics. The result was the appearance of two diametrically
opposed conceptions concerning the nature of semantics: interpretative semantics and generative
semantics. Proponents of the former approach believe that basic syntactic structures can be specified
independently of semantic considerations. Adherents to the second conception claim the inverse to be
true.
11 Davidson’s (1999, 2001) more recent theories have not substantially enhanced his previous work.
12 A couple of important early seeds of this theory were presented in Gelepithis (1984, 1989).
13 It should be noticed that the stated identification does not imply membership to the individualist
tradition (e.g., Chomsky 1995, Fodor 1980, Stich 1978).
14 For a recent survey of their roles see Allen and Barres (2009), Barres (2008).
15 Subsequent definitions are in terms of human animals. Generalisations to non-human animals and
machines are straightforward.
16 It should be noted that the phenomenon indicated by relation (2) is significantly more complex than
the phenomenon of semantic underdetermination (e.g., Bach 1994; and Saul 2002; Speaks 20008 for
more recent discussions). Actually, the latter (explicitly introduced by Grice 1968) is a special case of
the former. Naturally, skepseis (and more fundamentally Nm) constitute a third class of meaning in
addition to the natural/nonnatural (Grice 1957), or the natural/conventional (e.g., Stevenson 1944)
distinctions.
17 A slightly weaker claim has been argued by Hebb (1980b, p24), namely, verbal language is «an
adjunct to a primarily nonverbal mechanism.» For a similar conclusion to Hebb’s argued from the
philosophical viewpoint see Lurz (2007); for a recent debate Heyes (1998).
18 This is a minimalist definition of belief. It could have been stated in a way that it explicitly included
any combination of concepts, thoughts and skepseis. Since all three of the latter are defined in terms of
N and/or Nm, the minimalist definition was thought to be more appropriate.
19 Clearly, the proposed theory of thinking is in sharp contrast to both major approaches, namely the
standard psychological view of concepts (e.g., initially Fodor 1975; recently Margolis & Lawrence
2007) and the propositional (equivalently, Fregean or semantic) view (e.g., Peacocke 1992).
20 The same is true for major recent work both in the Hebbian tradition (e.g., Edelman 1987) and in
biologically inspired non-linear dynamics (e.g., Freeman 1999).
21 Thanks to Yiannis Kontos for raising this point (personal communication).
22 Acceptance of the MMP is not in conflict with Roediger’s (2008) conclusion of lack of memory
laws. It is actually compatible with the huge complexity and interactivity of memory phenomena that
is fully recognized by the science of memory community.
23 Wittgenstein’s (1953*1976) investigations may be illuminating in this respect if they are read as
such rather than as an argument for the nature of meaning.
24 Mattelart and Mattelart (1995*1998) state eleven disciplines involved with its study: Philosophy,
history, cybernetics, geography, psychology, biology, sociology, ethnology, economics, political
science, and the cognitive sciences!
25 Essentially, Grices’s important work is primarily on meaning (Table 1).
26 It should be noted that perceived in this way, ‘communication’ gives rise to numerous further splits
of interest. As Schramm remarks: such a relationship is very complex and due to the lack of “general
theoretical insights, researchers have typically worked on parts of the relationship”.
27 a) To make (opinions, feelings, information, etc.) known or understood by others; and b) to share or
exchange opinions, feelings, information, etc. (Longman, 1987).
28 The earliest conception of definition-12 can be found in Gelepithis (1984).
29 An exception in tackling understanding as a specific cognitive phenomenon can be seen in Sanford’s
(2003) reader.