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challenge to try to link individual legislative behavior with further success in
subnational races.
Given that context, it is not easy to assess the extent to which success in
subnational races is due to targeted performance in the legislature, combined with the
aforementioned possible factors. However, there is no reason not to try to empirically
assess this relationship. In this chapter, I evaluate whether different indicators of
submission of targeted bills makes, at least, a positive difference in the likelihood of
success in a subnational race.
Unfolding the Effect
In order to be fully consistent with the literature, I should specify a model that
takes the macro-level variables into account at the moment of making an electoral
prediction. It is hard to cast doubts about the influence of the national level factors over
subnational electoral results. In fact, the (scarce) literature about the Argentine case
posits substantive effects of national economic conditions over support for candidates
(Remmer and Gelineau 2003, Canton and Jorrat 2002, Seligson 2003, Gervasoni 1997,
1998, Gelineau 2002, Echegaray 2005, Singer and Rosas 2007). However, recent pieces
have demonstrated how lower-level effects also make a difference for subnational
actors' performance. Gelineau and Remmer (2006) find that subnational economic
performance is a good predictor of subnational electoral success, along with the national
economy. Similarly, Porto and Porto (2000) show that fiscal performance at the
municipaΓ level affected mayoral elections in the Province of Buenos Aires.
Nevertheless, my interest is to understand whether congressional activity, and
especially bill drafting, makes a difference in electoral performance. Even if I wanted to