Ill
are keystones of power in Argentine politics, mayoral positions are also considerably
strong. Moreover, some extremely powerful governors based their strength in a
structure of loyal mayors that built up an almost invincible electoral machine. Thus,
should legislators not enact strategies to become mayors? In this case, should these
strategies not be different in scope, cost and degrees of competitiveness? As Qiapter 5
and 6 demonstrate, when territorial boundaries of ambition change, prospective
behavior does too. In as much, defensive strategies also change over the basis of past
subnational experience. As a consequence, further work on subnational politics in
Argentina should take into account the huge within-province variation, as well as the
effects of municipal actors even on federal politics.
Finally, the distinction of the differential effect of strategic bill drafting on
chances of winning the candidacy arid general electoral victory makes also a substantive
point for the future. Anticipation of further ambition involves maximizing currently
available resources. However, the final outcome of the goal varies across time, subjects
and circumstances. At the stage of defining who will have access to office, politics
become a zero-sum game. Thus, not every single legislator who behaves strategically
will end up winning the spot they desire. However, this does not imply that strategic
use of legislation cannot be useful for the first step towards becoming a mayor or a
governor. Territorial targets may act as signals to party leaders, comrades and party
loyalists that vote in a primary. Success at this stage is not fully independent from future
performance, but it differs from victory in a general election. In fact, as chapter 7
demonstrates, no substantive effect of legislative submission on success could be found.
However, legislators keep on submitting targeted bills. Is this behavior just a way of
wasting time, or is it the product of other intermediate steps for which bills could be