15
inaccurate. This made scholars like Carey (1996) criticize the use of the "almost
axiomatic status" of the U.S. based model. However, this erroneous appreciation does
not necessarily imply that politicians do not care about their futures or that there is no
electoral impact of their labor in office. It is also not necessarily true that, during their
tenure, current legislators do not have an audience and do not write bills with a specific
goal in mind.
In any case, legislators in each of these multilevel and non-static environments
can be considered rational actors in that they try to keep and increase political power. In
doing so, they are likely to use all the available resources that can contribute to their
political improvement. As stated in the aforementioned literature on incumbency
advantage in the U.S., legislators in office have some valuable goods to use in their
favor: contracts, staff, media exposure, subsidies and, of course, legislation. By writing,
pushing, and achieving the passage of bills, legislators affect the distribution of
resources, highlight selected events, target groups, create a sense of responsiveness, and
control other branches of power. As most legislators do not retire after serving one
legislative term (i.e., discrete ambition), we can safely assume that legislators
prospectively use their current term in office to advance their future careers (Crisp &
Desposato 2004). Following this reasoning, current legislative behavior is likely to be
affected by career backgrounds and perspectives. In that case, legislators have strong
temptations to consider these further political positions at the moment of writing
legislation. As a result, specific career goals are expected to make a difference in
congressional performance.
In fact, this statement is not new for the literature in American politics: "Running
for higher office usually entails an appeal to a larger, more heterogeneous constituency, those
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