21
period in Congress in different times of their career, and have also moved back and forth
between the House and municipalities and/or governorships. Taking these multiple
movements into account would increase the sample of individuals with subnational
expectations over time.
Table 3.1: Percentage of Legislators that ever run for a Subnational Executive
Position
|
Subnational Link |
Freq. |
Percent |
|
O ~ |
1,159 |
77.22 |
|
____________ 1______________ |
342 |
22.78 |
|
Total |
1,501 |
100 |
Given that a considerable portion of the sample of legislators in Argentina
expected a spot in subnational executives, the original question about anticipation of the
future becomes relevant again. Do patterns of legislative behavior of differ between
individuals with executive ambitions and those without them? No single scientific piece
has ever dealt with that issue. As an addition, the degree of subnational variation in
Argentina (electoral institutions, term limits, patterns of continuity in power, legislative
structure) makes the case very rich for multilevel analyses. For all the reasons
mentioned, Argentina is an excellent case to employ an empirical test of my hypotheses
about legislative behavior in multilevel systems. In order to tackle this uncertainty, it is
necessary to understand how the Argentine system works.