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Analyses of the Brazilian experience have shown that politics does involve
multilevel behavior. In particular, subnational dynamics affect the patterns of
campaigning (Ames 2000, Samuels 2003), the generation of alliances (the "reverse
coattails effect", Ames 1992), the timing of elections (Samuels 2003), the distribution of
pork (Samuels 2001) and the direction of political ambition (Samuels 2003). Following
Samuels' assertion, "about two-thirds of Brazilian politicians continue their careers at the sub-
national level after serving in the Chamber of Deputies". Related to political careers, circa 70%
of ruling legislators seek reelection in the Brazilian House, but just two thirds of those
(globally 50%) get it (Samuels 2003, Lodola 2009). In contrast, most of the remaining 30%
seek a gubernatorial or mayoral position immediately after their legislative mandates,
and several of those still in office run for subnational positions during their legislative
tenure. This illustrates that Brazilian politicians pursue multi-tier careers, and that the
modified direction of progressive ambition does also take place. However, given that
70% of incumbents are looking for reelection, the relative weight of the subnational
ambition deserves some additional discussion, especially in comparative perspective.
Samuels demonstrates that politicians in Brazil secure a legislative seat and then run for
a subnational executive position. However, it is also reasonable to assume politicians
may move in the opposite direction (e.g., mayors and governors jumping to Congress).
Probably, only a natural experiment that unified the timing of elections would give the
right answer.
Mexico has recently acquired its full democratic status after decades of PRI's
dominance. However, as stated in the literature, subnational democratization started
earlier than the federal one, at least in terms of true electoral disputes (Hemandez
Chavez 1994, Ochoa-Reza 2004, Gibson 2004). Increases in the competitiveness of