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Selectorate21. Ames (2001) shows a very similar pattern for the behavior of Brazilian
deputies22. So, I will maintain the assumption that the mere submission of bills can
contribute to the credit claiming of every individual legislator. In the next chapters, I
will empirically assess to what extent targeted bill submission is linked with past career
background, and also with further career ambitions.
Conclusion
For its institutional and behavioral characteristics, Argentina is an excellent case
to test hypotheses about multi-level career perspectives and legislative performance.
Given the multi-tier structure of political careers and the subnational anchors of even
federal politics; activities performed to create subnational support should be the
expected outcome of political efforts in Argentina. Taking the lack of static ambition in
Congress and the needs of keeping districts as references into account, legislative efforts
should be devoted to targeting voters, groups and provincial leaders. In the next
chapters, I will empirically assess the validity of this statement.
21 This intuition has been subject to empirical verification through in-depth interviews with Argentine
legislators. Without expectations Of generalization, the reasoning was consistent with most of
representatives’ revealed experiences.
22 The so called “avulsos” (tickets proving the submission of a bill) are the evidence that legislators use to
show responsiveness during campaigns.