TO SURVIVE DE GAULLE
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IV. Factionalism and Party Building
Any French political party which hopes to win and to retain a parlia-
mentary majority must learn to survive that traditional Gallic malady:
factionalism. This disease played a major role in the demise of the RPF. It
continues to threaten the survival of the UDR.
With its initial purpose the avoidance of competition between Gaullists
in the legislative elections of November, 1958, the UNR was formed on
October 1, 1958, as a federation of various Gaullist organizations, notably
the RPF remnant, now called the Centre National des Republicans Sociaux
(led by Roger Frey and Jacques Chaban-Delmas), the Union pour Ie
Renouveau Français (led by Jacques SousteIle), and the Convention Ré-
publicaine (led by Léon Delbecque)."" Roger Frey, Secretary-General of
the Républicains Sociaux, was named to that same post in the UNR. Hardly
had the new party come into being than its unity was severely tested over
the question of electoral alliances. Soustelle, who had played a key role in
turning the May 13, 1958, uprising in Algiers toward de Gaulle, now hoped
to wed the UNR to a grand alliance for the defense of French Algeria, in
partnership with André Morice, leader of the Centre Républicain, Roget
Duchet, Secretary-General of the Centre National des Indépendants (CNI),
and Georges Bidault, leader of the dissident Démocratie Chrétienne group.
Secretary-General Roger Frey and several UNR Central Committee mem-
bers, including Edmond Michelet, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and Michel
Debré, opposed such an alliance, largely on the grounds that it inevitably
would saddle the UNR with a Right-wing image. The moderates forced a
compromise, quite possibly with the help of de Gaulle, who sent Olivier
Guichard as his emissary to the Central Committee. The motion adopted by
the Central Committee stated that in order to avoid “the multiplication of
national and republican candidates and votes,” the Secretary-General was
being asked to “enter into contract with national political organizations,
including the Centre National des Indépendants, the Démocratie Chrétienne,
the Centre Républicain, and the Radical-Socialist Party.”"1 Frey was em-
powered to conclude nonaggression agreements — without mutual commit-
ment to French Algeria — with the Radical Socialists and others, as well
as with the parties of the Right.
This division within the UNR over Algerian policy — essentially over
whether the UNR should allow de GauIlc a free hand, or whether it should
press for integration of Algeria with France — continued to plague the
party for the next three years. When Roger Frey became Minister of In-
formation in early 1959, and was replaced by Albin Chalandon as UNR
Secretary-General, the French Algeria faction, led by Léon Delbccque,
turned on the new party chief as an obstacle to their policy goals. “11 faut