38
RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES
that a candidate for the National Assembly must win a vote equal to ten
percent of the registered voters in his district in order to enter the runoff,
rather than five percent of the actual vote, as previously required.189 Premier
Pompidou announced that the American and British type single ballot
system might one day become “useful, indeed necessary” in France.100
Since politics in France, as elsewhere, is more than a simple reflection
of the social and economic structure of society, the ultimate fate of large,
coalition parties of the GaulIist type in France will depend in good measure
upon the attitudes and behavior of political elites, both Gaullist and anti-
Gaullist. On the opposition side, the emergence of a Center-Left coalition
both broader and more stable than the present Federation of the Demo-
cratic and Socialist Left would force Gaullists to unite or to face electoral
disaster. There could be no better guarantee of Gaullist unity. To be sure,
the strength and rigidity of the Communist Party presents a serious obstacle
to unity of the Center-Left.
On the Gaullist side, should de Gaulle himself serve out his seven-year
term, should he determine that political parties, more than institutions,
were the key to continued political stability in France, and should he give
greater attention and respect to the organization of the Gaullist movement,
the present majority’s potential for survival would be increased. De Gaulle’s
vigorous support for Gaullist candidates in the March, 1967, elections and
his insistence that government ministers run for parliament on the Gaullist
slate were both signs of increasing interest in party affairs. His replacement
of Pompidou with Couve de Murville clearly demonstrated, however, that
he was still unwilling to allow party leaders to interfere with Presidential
government. Whatever de Gaulle may do, the fate of the Gaullist party will
depend in good part upon the organizational and political skills of future
party leaders.
Without de Gaulle, the UDR and its allies would indeed present a di-
verse coalition, but little more diverse, certainly, than the British Labour
Party, and far less so than the American Democratic Party. If the experi-
ence of other catchall parties in the United States, Britain, and Germany is
relevant, however, once having lost their arbiter, Gaullists will be able to
maintain their grand coalition only if they demonstrate a capacity for com-
promise, only if they facilitate the expression and adjustment of demands.
Those Gaullist leaders who share de Gaulle’s disdain for intermediary
groups and his distaste for consensus through compromise are poorly
equipped for the political broker’s role. The Gaullist conception of the
national interest as a truth visible only to those who hold themselves aloof
from the quarrels of selfish interests is one which lends itself very poorly
to noncharismatic coalition building.191 If leadership were to fall to men who
cling to that conception — “Gaullistes de foi,” Jean Chariot calls them —