What Lessons for Economic Development Can We Draw from the Champagne Fairs?



thing, three of the Champagne fair-towns (Provins, Bar-sur-Aube, and Troyes) had
privileges as
communes entitling them to operate municipal mayoral courts during this
period.40 Sometimes, as in Troyes in 1231 or Provins in 1270-9, the same man was
both town mayor and princely fair-warden, and it is difficult to distinguish in which
capacity he exercised jurisdiction in particular cases.41 The Provins charter of 1252
stated that merchants at the fairs were to be judged by the count and his officials, but
left foreign traders the option of using municipal courts: ‘and if it pleases them to seek
law in front of the mayor, the mayors have the liberty and power to do so ... and the
fines from the foreign merchants shall go to the commune up to 20
sols, and the
surplus shall be ours’. In apparent recognition of this joint jurisdiction, the 1252
charter stated that ‘the mayors and commune shall have, at the fairs of Provins, their
lodge on the pavement alongside that of the
prévôt’.42 The 1268 Provins charter also
stated firmly that foreign merchants were under princely jurisdiction, but also gave
them the option of bringing cases to the municipal jurisdiction, and confirmed that the
lodge of the mayoral court at the fairs should be located beside that of the
prévôt.43

How effective were municipal courts in providing the impartial contract-enforcement
necessary for international trade? The strongest evidence for their effectiveness is that
long-distance merchants chose to use them. According to both Bourquelot and Bautier,
municipal courts in Champagne did judge lawsuits at the fairs, and foreign merchants
at the fairs sometimes voluntarily chose to use them even though princely courts were
available.44 In 1278, for instance, a Florentine merchant appeared before the Provins
mayoral court declaring that he and his associates had received payment on a fair-
debt.45 Visiting merchants evidently used the municipal courts sufficiently often to
increase their caseload since, as Bourquelot discovered, the Provins town accounts
‘abound in details concerning expenditures of the commune on the occasion of the
fairs’, including the costs of carrying benches into the mayor’s judicial lodge.46
Further evidence of the attractiveness of municipal courts to foreign merchants is

40 In Bar-sur-Aube, c.1179-c.1260; in Provins, 1230-1335; in Troyes, 1230-1242. See Bourquelot
(1865), II:19-20; Bautier (1952), 318-19; Arbois de Jubainville (1859), 18-30; Tardif (1855); Terrasse
(2005), 45, 57, 61-3, 69-70, 77-9, 164, 215, 219, 232.

41 Chapin (1937), 126-33.

42 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:409.

43 Bourquelot (1839-40), II:416.

44 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:210; Bourquelot (1865), II:19-20; Bautier (1952), 318-19.

45 Davidsohn (1896-1901), 30.

46 Bourquelot (1865), II:20.



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