t = -Cl In (1 — pL) and FiL (t) = 1, that is, iL concedes with probability one before
t < T. Indeed, waiting until T would lead to a payoff lower than V — cl. Since
any symmetric equilibrium must be in mixed strategies, this is the only symmetric
equilibrium. Expected payoff of iL is V — cl, and expected payoff of iH is
Pl
[t (v
Jo
1 -ɪ _JL
— x)----e cl dx + e cl
PlCl
(” — T — ⅛H)
= V — Cl + exp
Cl
cH+f - t)∙
Hence, the ex ante expected payoff is
E (πi)
= v — cl + pH exP ^-—(cl--^^ + t —
t).
Inserting t leads to (8).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) Suppose that T < c∕2. Together with (3) and (5),
v /ʌ = -pLcL — pH f— + t ) + 5+ t = -pL~χ- + (1 — pH ) t > 0.
∖ 2 2 2 2
If T > c∕2, expected payoff is V — c in case (^ Λr) which is the payoff an informed
individual i can ensure by conceding immediately for both possible contribution costs.
Since for a high contribution cost, i strictly prefers waiting until T, his payoff must
be strictly higher. Thus, V°j ^ > 0 for all T ∈ (cl∕2,ch∕2).
(ii) If T < cl∕2 — cl InpH, subtracting the first row in (4) from the first row in (8)
leads to
v/ (T) = —cl — ɪ (ch — cl) e2 cl + pH (ɪ + t) .
2 ∖ 2 /
(14)
31
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