Federal Tax-Transfer Policy and Intergovernmental Pre-Commitment



ti as the source-based capital tax rate levied in state i.15 The profit maximizing input choices
deduce from the familiar first-order conditions

fli = wi and fki = r + ti .

(2)


The factor market equilibrium follows from Eqs. (1), (2), the capital market clearing condition

k1 + k2 = 2к, and the labor market clearing condition li = Li.16 The responses of li, ki, r and
wi to a rise in capital or labor taxes are

∂ki _ 1   ∂ki _ -1   ∂r _ —fjk

(3)


(4)


W = ∆, ∂tj = Δ^, ∂ti = ∆

and

∂li _ -1 ∂wi _ fll
∂τ σ , ∂τ σ ,

with Δ := fklk + fkk < 0 and σ := — h00(P,) — fl > 0. The comparative static results reflect
the interplay of the additive separability of preferences and of the assumption
flik = 0. They
insulate the labor (capital) market from capital (labor) taxation.

Incorporating optimal labor supply and factor demand choices and general equilibrium ef-
fects, we can write utility as a function of tax rates and public expenditures,
V i(τ, ti , tj , gi).
Noting that output is exhausted by factor payments, i.e.
ci = f (ki, li) — fkki — τli + rk, and
making use of Eqs. (1) - (4)

• ∙ ∙ ∙ '*⅛' ∙

Vi = — li, Vj = -ki (= к) and Vj = 0, i = j,                 (5)

with symmetric capital tax rate choices. The result Vtij = 0 reflects the opposing effects a higher

tax rate in state j has on interest income and land income in state i. The income changes nullify

15 For simplicity, the production factor land is omitted from notation in the subsequent analysis.

16 The capital market clearing condition implies that capital is in fixed supply at the federal level. The assump-
tion is intended to reflect the differential degree of capital mobility in a federation (being highest at the local
level) in an analytically tractable way. If capital were in elastic supply for the federation as a whole, the labor tax
would be set at a lower (same) level if
flik > 0 (flik = 0) ceteris paribus; see Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991). The
level effect on labor taxes applies to all decision-making scenarios considered in the paper; thereby suggestively
not compromising the relative policy evaluation.



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