Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs

Europe: North and Weingast Revisited,” The Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics and Organization 18: 155-186.

[44 Stiglitz, Joseph (1974), “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecrop-
ping,” Review of Economic Studies 41: 219-255.

[45 Swart, Koenraad W. (1980), Sale of Office in the Seventeenth Cen-
tury (Hes Publishers, Uthrect).

[46 Szostak, Rick (1991), The Role of Transportation in the Industrial
Revolution - A Comparison of England and France (McGill-Queen’s
University Press, Montreal and Kingston).

[47 Toma Eugena F. and Toma Mark (1992), “Tax Collection with
Agency Costs: Private Contracting or Government Bureaucrats,”
Economica, 59: 107-120.

[48 Velde, Francois R. and Weir, David R. (1992), “The Financial Mar-
ket and Government Debt Policy in France, 1746-1793,” Journal of
Economic History 52: 1-39.

[49 Vierhaus Rudolf (1999), ”The Preussian Bureaucracy Reconsid-
ered,” in The Eighteenth Century State in Britain and Germany,
Brewer, John and Eckhart, Hellmut (eds.), (Oxford University
Press, Oxford).

[50 Weber Max (1968), Economy and Society (Bedminster Press, New
York, NY).

[51 Weir, David R. (1989), “Tontines, Public Finance and Revolution
in France and England, 1688-1789,” Journal of Economic History
49: 95-124.

[52 White, Eugene N. (1995), “The French Revolution and the Politics
of Government Finance, 1770-1815,” Journal of Economic History
55: 227-255.

33

<<   31   32   33   34   35   36   37   >>

More intriguing information