Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan, Lobbying and Compromise, February 2005
Marcel F. M. Canoy, Jan C. van Ours and Frederick van der Ploeg, The Economics of
Books, February 2005
Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woβmann, Does Educational Tracking Affect
Performance and Inequality? Differences-in-Differences Evidence across Countries,
February 2005
George Kapetanios and M. Hashem Pesaran, Alternative Approaches to Estimation and
Inference in Large Multifactor Panels: Small Sample Results with an Application to
Modelling of Asset Returns, February 2005
Samuel Mühlemann, Jürg Schweri, Rainer Winkelmann and Stefan C. Wolter, A
Structural Model of Demand for Apprentices. February 2005
Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco, Educational Standards in Private and Public
Schools, February 2005
Alex Bryson, Lorenzo Cappellari and Claudio Lucifora, Why so Unhappy? The Effects
of Unionisation on Job Satisfaction, March 2005
Annalisa Luporini, Relative Performance Evaluation in a Multi-Plant Firm, March 2005
Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni, When the Union Hurts the Workers: A
Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy, March 2005
Pieter Gautier, Michael Svarer and Coen Teulings, Marriage and the City, March 2005
Ingrid Ott and Stephen J. Turnovsky, Excludable and Non-Excludable Public Inputs:
Consequences for Economic Growth, March 2005
Frederick van der Ploeg, Back to Keynes?, March 2005
Stephane Dees, Filippo di Mauro, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Exploring
the International Linkages of the Euro Area: a Global VAR Analysis, March 2005
Hans Pitlik, Friedrich Schneider and Harald Strotmann, Legislative Malapportionment
and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System, March 2005
Konstantinos Angelopoulos and Apostolis Philippopoulos, The Role of Government in
Anti-Social Redistributive Activities, March 2005
Ansgar Belke and Daniel Gros, Asymmetries in the Trans-Atlantic Monetary Policy
Relationship: Does the ECB follow the Fed?, March 2005
Soren Blomquist and Luca Micheletto, Optimal Redistributive Taxation when
Government’s and Agents’ Preferences Differ, March 2005