Table 10.5. Results of the performance analysis in Nolloth. n=30 heads of fishing households. ns=trend
not significant; *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.
|
Indicator |
Average |
Average change |
Average future | ||
|
Equity | |||||
|
1. Role of fishers in management |
7.63 |
1.2667** |
+13% |
0.1000ns |
+1% |
|
2. Access to marine resources |
6.60 |
-1.6667*** |
-17% |
-0.8667*** |
-9% |
|
3. Fair distribution of fishing gears |
7.63 |
1.7333*** |
+17% |
0.4667* |
+5% |
|
4. Economic equality |
6.67 |
-0.4333ns |
-4% |
-0.5667ns |
-6% |
|
Efficiency | |||||
|
5. Communal decision-making |
6.77 |
-0.8667* |
-9% |
-0.5333** |
-5% |
|
6. Ease of entry into the fishery |
7.20 |
-1.0333* |
-10% |
-1.000*** |
-10% |
|
7. Control over access to fishery |
7.30 |
1.1667* |
+12% |
0.4000* |
+4% |
|
8. Compliance with fishery rules |
7.47 |
0.4333ns |
+4% |
-0.5000ns |
-5% |
|
Social Sustainability | |||||
|
9. Family well-being |
7.13 |
0.7333ns |
+7% |
0.0333ns |
+0,3% |
|
10. Income |
6.23 |
-1.0667ns |
-11% |
-0.3667ns |
-4% |
|
11. Tradition of collective action |
7.53 |
-0.8333ns |
-8% |
-0.4667ns |
-5% |
|
12. Discussion of village issues |
8.00 |
0.6667ns |
+7% |
0.0333ns |
+0.3% |
|
13. Community harmony |
6.20 |
-1.1667ns |
-12% |
-0.7667* |
-8% |
|
Biological sustainability | |||||
|
14. Marine resource health |
5.63 |
-3.1333*** |
-31% |
-1.5333*** |
-15% |
|
15. Fish catch |
5.23 |
-3.7667*** |
-38% |
-2.0333*** |
-20% |
Not everybody is selected to partake in the government programs that aim to improve the
livelihood of poor villagers. The ones not included feel that the village government does not
address their concerns. These people, who represent the lower social classes in Nolloth, have
less confidence in the village government and say that “they take care of themselves.”
Women in the village are marginalized and have a dependent attitude. Communication among
women also seems minimal where it concerns village issues or problems. This is possibly a
result of village organizational structures that are hierarchical and leave little space for internal
discussions. Ordinary women have no voice and are not well represented within the women’s
organizations. When it comes to village affairs and decision-making, the women generally
show a lack of interest.
Nolloth has a relatively strong local resource management system because it has a strong
village government and an organizational structure that includes traditional authorities. The
village has clearly defined operational rules that are written down, executed according to
accepted collective rules and based on adat constitutional rules. Compliance to the rules is
high, not in the least because of an active and functional kewang system. Nolloth does face
difficulties defending its territory against outsiders. In these cases, the Saparua police force
can be counted upon to assist, but only if the kewang catches the offenders first.
The Nolloth form of sasi confers certain economic benefits to the village, in general, and to
the ruling elite and their associates, in particular. Leaders associated with the institution are
also rewarded with high social status. However, the institution cannot be said to be inclusive
or democratic. In fact, the originally common property regime has become a system with
private property rights.
Desa Nolloth, Saparua Island 119
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