An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



incentive for the people to comply with the sasi regulations. However, if the kewang is
undermined by conflicts and lack of support from the village leader, its position will weaken
and some people will be encouraged to try breaking the rules.

The church plays an important role in enforcement through their communal prayers. Respect
for God and fear of retribution keep people abiding to the rules.

Social pressure

Since most people benefit from sasi in terms of resources and status, peer group pressure to
respect the rules is strong. The fact that many young children are members of the mini-
kewang
and authorized to report offenders will be a strong incentive for people (and young children)
to abide to the rules.

Conservation purposes

The continuous efforts of Ambon University and local NGOs have led to awareness by a large
part of the population and people are developing an appreciation for resource management. Visible
protection of natural resources is in many cases an incentive for people to comply with the rules.

Awareness

The programs carried out by various external institutions have created environmental
awareness that will be an incentive for some people to comply with the rules.

Youths can partake in the mini-kewang where they learn about the environment and how to
protect it. They are rewarded within the organization but also see the effect of their personal
efforts. Children thus learn to appreciate nature and this will be an important incentive not to
destroy the resources.

11.7 Patterns of Interaction

The village territory can be categorized as a collective good and as such, under the
responsibility of the village. A clear set of property rights has been installed to secure a stream
of benefits for all. Fruit and tree gardens are private property, but harvest rights are arranged
under
sasi as a collective right. Sasi on land is imposed to provide benefits to the individual
while protecting the resource.

The sea is a communal property (res communes) in which the resource is controlled by an
identifiable community of interdependent users. An identifiable community in this context
refers to the people who live in Haruku-Sameth (Mantjoro 1996a). The members of neighboring
villages on the same island are excluded. Marine
sasi has direct communal benefits and people
have the right to them.

This system, however, is under threat. Land resources, which are private property, are subject
to national legislation that defines all land as belonging to the state. Article 33 of the national
constitution enacted in 1945 stipulated that land and water-based resources belong to the
state and will be exploited to the optimum for the wealth and welfare of all citizens (Mantjoro
1996a). This has allowed the Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources to issue a permit for
mine exploration in the area.

Desa Haruku and Sameth, Haruku Island 135



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