fishers are members of village organizations and satisfied with their jobs.
There is no evidence that sasi has any impact on the health of the fishery in general, doubtless
because sasi pertains only to small, inshore areas and most fish are caught in the deep sea.
Both sasi and non-sasi villages suffer from blast fishing. Sasi areas are also vulnerable to damage
caused by external forces such as mining exploration. At a local level, guarded sasi areas
suffer less damage than adjacent unguarded areas. On a regional level, however, the coral
reef condition is more closely related to population density and fishing pressure than to the
presence or absence of the sasi institution. More research into the condition of a larger number
of guarded sasi areas would be useful.
The practice of sasi has demonstrable benefits in protecting the valuable top shells (Trochus
niloticus) and sea cucumbers. Although there are suitable habitats and a history of exploitation
in non-sasi villages, the presence of top shells and sea cucumbers has been extremely rare.
This suggests that these species may now be largely confined to sasi areas that are subject to
harvest restrictions and guarded.
Socio-economic variables correlated with performance of sasi (see Table 2.6) included the style
of village decision-making, job satisfaction of fishers, belief in the importance of sasi, attitudes
towards changing and bending rules and selling harvest rights, the type of gears owned,
external sources of income, economic score, and whether fishers are part of village groups
and/or are involved in communal fishing. Interestingly, perceptions of resource health are
not correlated with a desire to change fisheries rules. Fishers with more expensive gears feel
they have more say in decision-making.
For optimal collaboration between the kewang and the police in enforcement, a clear definition
of rights and mandates should be developed. In many villages, sasi regulations are considered
more legitimate than “government rules”. Compliance also increases if the villagers profit
directly from the management of the resource.
Fishers, in general, find it important that all stakeholders are represented in decision-making.
When fishers feel that village decision-making is based on consensus or majority agreement,
they have more positive scores on all performance indicators. For a management system, it is
thus important that the decision-making process is perceived to be inclusive. Insulation of
the management institution from political turmoil is also important. Where formal and
traditional leaders collaborate closely, and where leadership is highly legitimate, sasi thrives.
What makes the sasi institution strong (and thus resilient) is it links the various players and
components i.e., legitimacy, trust, collaboration, and transparency. A shared notion of the
relevance of the institution is also needed to stimulate a common objective to maintain sasi in
spite of external influences.
The practice of sasi in central Maluku proves that rules pertaining to gear types, access, closed
areas and seasons can be successfully developed and applied at the local level by villagers
who have relatively low levels of formal education as well as only a hazy concept of resource
management. In the place of a science-based rationale for management, we find an ethic of
working together for the benefit of the community, attachment to a cultural tradition and the
tendency to comply with sanctions based on religious beliefs. These have combined to form
the basis of a resilient and, within its narrow scope of application, demonstrably effective
institution. Sasi also provides an alternative to the western idea that local management must
be highly democratic. The paternalistic model is potentially very efficient and cost-effective,
putting little demand on the time of busy fishers, farmers and women, and is also culturally
Introduction 9