Confusion over land rights was, in some cases, due to changes in government unit boundaries.
Changes in administrative boundaries and the effects of World War II were most prevalent on
Ambon and Nusa Laut. Pressure from worsening economic conditions, for instance, the
collapse of the clove price in the early 1990s, crop failures, and decline of resources were also
mentioned as causing sasi to collapse.
The lack of effective enforcement, in combination with economic needs, political turmoil, and
urbanization provided the incentives for people to non-comply. Compliance and enforcement
problems seem more prevalent in Christian villages, and particularly on Ambon Island. The
village government often delegated the authority over sasi to the church, and in many cases,
sasi adat and marine sasi declined at the same time. As of 1997, political or religious conflicts
were documented as affecting 13 of the remaining sasi villages. In other words, in about a
quarter of remaining sasi villages, the institution is under strain.
Table 17.10. Reasons causing sasi to become (partly or completely) non-functional.
|
Cause of decline of sasi |
No. of Comments |
|
Take-over of adat sasi by church |
13 |
|
Poor leadership led to decline in enforcement and compliance |
11 |
|
Economic pressures led to non-compliance |
4 |
|
Conflict over leadership (adat and formal government) |
3 |
|
Change in administrative boundaries |
3 |
|
Conflict between church and adat or between churches |
2 |
|
Conflicts over land rights caused compliance problem |
1 |
|
Urbanization and degradation of resources |
1 |
|
Collapse of clove prices increased fishing pressure |
1 |
|
Others (moral disintegration, outsider interference, more |
4 |
17.5 Results of the Comparative Case Study
The findings, from the in-depth interviews conducted as part of the case studies in the six
villages, underscore the link between the different components (objectives, rules), the players,
and the external context of the sasi institution, and illustrate the interactions among these
through time.
Although both the Nolloth and Haruku villages having a strong sasi institution, the cases are
distinct. Whereas Nolloth can be described as a system designed primarily to provide resource
rent for the village government, Haruku’s sasi has more to do with the fair distribution of fish
resources and conservation. Nolloth is a stable village, with legitimate leadership and the
strong representation of traditional authorities. The kewang is functional and, together with
the village head, serious in the prosecution of offenders. The harvest rights of sasi are reserved
for the village cooperative (KUD) and income accrues to the village government and the
harvesters. Other villagers benefit indirectly through village development. In Haruku, a more
important role is ascribed to the kewang and relatively less to the village head, except when
he is also a raja. Kewang members feel a strong responsibility towards sasi. The harvest is
communal and distributed among the villagers. Recently, the villagers in Haruku have become
divided as a result of the installation of a new village head. This leader, elected with a slender
majority, supports sasi but also favors mining development that threatens the resources under
sasi. This has led to confusion and a dysfunctional village government, a situation that in
turn poses a threat to sasi.
Institutional Resilience : Loss and Revival of Sasi 247