17.5.2 Rules and regulations
In order to regulate the harvest, certain rules have to be practiced. Nolloth, Haruku, and
Hulaliu have written sasi regulations (see Appendix 6 for Nolloth rules). The operational
rules specify the products and marine species under sasi, gear restrictions, the timing of the
harvest, etc. These operational rules are the base on which the fishers make their day-to-day
decisions over compliance. The operational rules are nested in a set of collective rules which
define the decision-making process regarding the opening and closing of seasons, how to
regulate access, how enforcement is arranged etc. On the third level - the constitutional level
- the structure of the sasi institution is defined through adat. Adat prescribes who are involved
in the process and what their roles are, e.g., which clans and persons are responsible for
decision-making, conflict resolution, execution of ceremonies and enforcement (also see
Ostrom 1990).
The process of decline involves non-compliance to operational rules but this in turn is directly
dependent on the effectiveness of the collective-choice rules. In Hulaliu, a conflict between
the village head and kewang in which the kewang’s rights were neglected, i.e., a collective-
choice level problem, was the root cause for sasi to decline. Subsequent problems with
compliance (operational level) were secondary, i.e., the result of lack of kewang enforcement.
Adat as part of the village culture, however, persisted, and thus the constitutional rules
remained intact.
Over the last decades, operational rules have been modified. Boundaries of sasi areas,
frequency of open and closed seasons, division of benefits, restrictions on gear use, etc. all
may and do change. In practical management terms, this affects the function of sasi but does
not threaten its continued existence. On the other hand, where the constitutional rules were
challenged, e.g., a shift of authority from the kewang to the church, the loss of the kewang, the
introduction of police as enforcers, the promulgation of national fisheries legislation, the
structure or legal basis of the sasi institution then changed and this can lead to the
disappearance of part or all of a local sasi institution. Adaptation of constitutional rules may
also, however, strengthen sasi. For example, in Haruku where sasi on marine resources is
enforced by the kewang, there is also sasi on coconuts and cloves that is enforced by the church.
The reason why these commodities are under church sasi, is because the people asked the
church to become involved at a period when theft was significant. Since then, the church has
had a role that is distinct from, but supportive of, that of the kewang.
Because operational and collective rules may be lost more easily, they as particular entities
are less resilient than constitutional rules. However, the fact that operational rules and to a
lesser extent, the collective-choice rules, can be changed or abandoned and then revived, is
an important feature contributing to adaptiveness and resilience of the larger institution.
Some sasi operational rules overlap and support national fisheries law on destructive gear
types. In Haruku and Nolloth, formal regulations on mesh size, and the use of poisons, blast
fishing and lift nets are included in the sasi rules. As is typical of non-sasi villages, Seri has
only a few informal rules, while Toisapu-Hutumuri has no local fisheries regulations at all. A
lack of effectively enforced government rules has provided an incentive for fishers in Hutumuri
to push for local management that can protect their fishing grounds against outsiders. Under
national law, local adat institutions and village governments are allowed to pass local rules as
long as they do not contradict national or provincial law. What is lacking is the motivation
for village leaders to act in the absence of direction from a higher level.
Institutional Resilience : Loss and Revival of Sasi 249