the interests of the pro-mining lobby. Hence, he lacks the local legitimacy to play a guiding
role in sasi. This situation, wherein the village head and the kewang each represent the two
opponent groups in the village, seriously undermines the sasi institution.
Under the Indonesian system, all candidates for local elections must be screened and approved
by the government. Hence, elections can be manipulated either in favor of or against traditional
leaders. Popular candidates may be disqualified at this stage, or some votes may simply be
neglected during the election process. On one hand, lingering adat structures may make
nonsense of the concept of democratic elections. On the other hand, traditional leaders with
broad popular support may also be vulnerable. Cases from Haruku and Hutumuri show that
external interests may influence the election of a village head and thus the functioning of sasi.
17.5.5 The boundaries
Marine sasi is generally applied to shallow inshore areas. Outside the sasi area, other parts of
the village territory, including the deep waters beyond the fringing reef, may also be rented
(as in Tuhaha and Hulaliu). Generally, the boundaries of the sasi and other rented areas are
clearly defined, and have remained largely the same over the years. The boundaries are
generally accepted. Even though fishers may accept such restricted access without complaint,
they often have reservations. In Tuhaha, a lack of legitimacy is compensated by a strong
enforcement mechanism. Acceptance of boundaries of restricted areas requires legitimacy of
the leaders, direct benefits for the excluded users, and/or a strong enforcement mechanism.
17.5.6 Enforcement and compliance
Enforcement of sasi regulations is carried out by the kewang, the police, and/or village
government. In both Nolloth and Haruku, the kewang is strong and plays an important role in
the enforcement of regulations. In coastal villages, there is still a firm belief that ancestral
spirits and God guard the sasi regulations. Even in cases where the village government is
responsible for enforcement, traditional sanctions can still play a role. “The offender can be
lucky and escape from the kewang or police, but he still may get sick,” explained Abraham
Pattypelu, a fisher in Tuhaha. “Before long, he will seek either the church minister or tuan
negeri (in more traditional villages) to confess his mischief because only a prayer or ceremony
can relieve him from his burden.”
The traditional kewang is highly legitimate and not in the least because it enforces the law
without showing favoritism. Police personnel have the formal authority to implement the
rules, but act arbitrarily and are not trusted by the people. Their effectiveness is also hampered
by the fact that they reside far from the village and when they are needed, they take too long
to arrive. In villages that have no active kewang, as in Tuhaha and Hulaliu, enforcement is,
therefore, difficult.
In villages where sasi is gone and/or where the kewang has been abolished, authority has
shifted from the traditional enforcers to the formal village government. In Christian villages,
the government may have enforcement support from the church. In Haruku, Hulaliu, and
Tuhaha, the church is only involved in sasi on coconuts, while in Nolloth, the church minister
closely collaborates with the village head and the kewang and is present at adat ceremonies,
including those of marine sasi. In non-sasi villages, the church has not been seen to play a role
in supporting enforcement of fisheries rules although it may, as in Seri, be called upon to
bless fishers and their boats. The church is only directly involved in land sasi and not in
marine sasi. This is because fishing is economically too important and people will always
252 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia