power shift from adat leaders to the church or government, adjustment of constitutional
elements also occurs.
18.3.8 Compliance
In the eyes of fishers, compliance to fisheries rules is significantly better in villages with
marine sasi. Although written records of violations are not kept at the village level, verbal
testimonies by village leaders indicated that intrusions into guarded sasi areas were not
common. When they did occur, they were usually attributed to outsiders rather than locals
and in many cases, fishers from particular non-sasi villages were named as the likely or known
perpetrators. Where the sasi area was not guarded or the enforcers not respected, intrusions
were reputedly more common. In general, fishers are expected to comply with, or violate
fisheries rules, depending on the set of incentives and options available to them.
18.4 Incentives to Cooperate and Comply
To influence the success or failure of local fisheries management is to influence the perception
of fishers regarding the management system, for fishers either comply and cooperate with
management or do not, based on their perceived reality. When fishers choose not to comply
with rules, there is no effective management. In the course of interactions among marine resource
stakeholders within the historical, cultural, and economic context of Maluku, incentives and
disincentives to cooperate and comply with resource management have developed.
18.4.1 Incentives related to enforcement of sasi
Enforcement power
Enforcement capacity is very limited whether one considers sasi practitioners (kewang) or
government authorities (police and navy). Kewang members are generally well motivated
but lack equipment such as speedboats, communication devices, etc. The police may be useful
as a backup for an active kewang but are rarely on the spot to patrol or arrest offenders. Neither
police nor navy are well-equipped to deal with the vast expanse of sea in Maluku, and their
managers have little motivation to improve the situation.
Fear of retribution from God or of being socially outcast does appear to constitute a powerful
incentive for fishers to comply with local rules within their village territories. Even so, sasi
fishers are pragmatic. In times of need, they reserve the right to apply for exemption to the
rules and expect leniency in enforcement because “we have to eat fish”. This pragmatism is
also exhibited in the form of resistance to the idea of placing any essential food or commercial
fish under sasi and especially under church sasi, where sanctions can include sickness and death.
The risk of being caught by kewang or police, or punished by God, often does not deter outside
fishers from using illegal gear types or stealing sasi products. The kewang has no legal right to
impose the kind of large fines or jail terms that might discourage those less spiritual members
of society such as the blast fishers and non-Mollucans.
Legitimacy of enforcers
There are times when the enforcement efforts of the kewangs fail, in which case they may
appeal to the village head who will either punish the offenders directly or call in the police.
Overall Discussion and Conclusions 265