An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia



18.3.5 Enforcement

All community residents have the duty to report violations of sasi to the kewang or village
head. The rules are regularly publicized through
kewang rituals as well as through the church.
In the past, compliance depended on local beliefs that the rituals around opening and closing
harvesting areas are witnessed by ancestral spirits. These witnesses were believed to punish
those who violate
sasi prohibitions by inflicting illness or even death (Bailey and Zerner 1992).
The introduction of modern religions has influenced
sasi practices. For instance, traditional
sasi rituals are often followed by prayers in the church. This is done to ask the protection of
God, and to reinforce the concept that people who do not obey the rules will be punished not
only by the
kewang, but also by God.

The kewang meets at intervals to consider cases of rule violations, and interrogates the accused
before deciding on sanctions. Sanctions in the past often involved public shaming; today,
they can be monetary. In Itawaka, if family members of the
kewang are found disobeying the
law, the sanctions are doubled.
Sasi regulations apply not only to local community members
but also to outsiders; however, enforcement is much more difficult if outsiders are the rule
breakers, because the
kewang has no legal powers of enforcement.

Other enforcers who may be involved in marine sasi are the police. Their role has increased
since the 1979 law on village government left the
kewang outside of the formal government
structure. However in most cases, the police are too distant to be of assistance. They usually
get involved only when asked by a village head to take away someone apprehended by the
kewang. Police involvement is only appropriate in cases where the sasi regulation coincides
with a formal village, provincial or national law. The navy also have jurisdiction in such
cases (for instance, in enforcing a blast fishing ban) but we never heard of any instance where
the navy personnel were sighted in a village territory. In general, villagers have much more
respect for the
kewang than for the police. The kewang has greater legitimacy and is seen as
being more fair and reliable.

18.3.6 Revision of rules

Sasi rules are not static. Both the rules and the reasons for applying them have changed
through time (Zerner 1992). In Haruku, for example,
sasi rules were formally revised in 1985,
in part to move
sasi more in the direction of resource conservation (Kissya 1995). The rules
were drawn up during a meeting of the customary council (
dewan adat), which is equivalent
to the traditional
saniri of clan chiefs. The rules were then made official when they were
signed by the
raja, the head of the land kewang, and the head of the sea kewang. At that time,
the
raja was also the village head.

Sasi rules have also been formally written down, with or without revision, in Ihamahu (in
1995), Nolloth (in 1990), and Itawaka (1995) (Appendix 6). In both of the latter cases, the
village government played a prominent role, whereas in Ihamahu and Haruku, the process
was more
kewang-driven.

18.3.7 Revitalization

Because the constitutional rules are embedded in adat, sasi never really “dies”. However,
operational and collective-choice rules can and do cease to function. Revitalization of a local
institution therefore mainly involves re-installing the collective-choice decision-making bodies
and processes and reviving or rewriting operational rules. In some cases where there is a

264 An Institutional Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia



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