An institutional analysis of sasi laut in Maluku, Indonesia

out to sea. Their fishing grounds now overlap the area utilized by commercial and industrial
fishers and future conflict between the sectors is inevitable if management and conflict
resolution arrangements are not set in place. Recent research indicates that several key
commercial stocks are being over-fished and the region is losing productive and diverse coral
reefs because of destructive fishing practices.

NGO and academic researchers, noting these trends, have begun to push the government to
look for ways to revive or establish local management, with sasi as the basis. At the village
level, the incentive for considering local management is most often the potential for the village
government to collect resource rents, which is already an established feature of sasi as currently
practiced in Maluku. For fishers themselves, the incentives are more linked to culture than to
a consciousness of the need for management. In what ways is sasi a suitable model or basis
for future fisheries management arrangements?

18.3 Sasi as a Management Institution in Maluku: Patterns of Interaction

Management institutions have commonly been discussed in the literature in terms of a game
that has defined players, constitutional rules, collective-choice rules and operational rules
(Gardner and Ostrom 1991). Patterns of interaction among stakeholders of the resource under
management can be discussed in terms of the institution as operationalized in its cultural,
physical, biological, and economic contexts. Stakeholders will be motivated to comply or
cooperate with the institution according to the incentives and options inherent in their
situation. The outcome of these interactions can be assessed in terms of the contribution to
social and biological sustainability, and the efficiency and equitability of management.

18.3.1 Constitutional rules

The constitutional rules of the sasi institution stem directly from adat and are, therefore, rather
complex and philosophical as compared to, for instance, a scientifically-based modern
management institution. Adat defines the sasi institution and lays down the basic ethics and
codes of conduct. The constitutional rules thus form an intrinsic part of Maluku culture. They
are generally known by the populace, but are not written down. One example is the concept of
the unity of man with nature and the belief that to destroy nature is to invite the wrath of the
ancestors. Others include such things as the inheritance of leader status through the male raja
line, the responsibility of the tuan negeri and ketua adat to preserve sacred words and knowledge
for use in ceremonies, and the names of founding families who have the right to hold certain
positions such as tuan tanah, tuan negeri, kepala kewang, marinyo, etc. The status of the village
territory as the common property of village residents, where outsiders must obtain permission
for access and withdrawal rights, is also a constitutional rule embedded in adat.

18.3.2 Collective-choice rules

Collective-choice rules define how the players in sasi work together. For instance, they include
the rules which define how clan leaders, kewang members and other traditional leaders are
selected, and also how they subsequently perform tasks such as the amendment of existing
operational rules. In strong adat villages, these collective-choice rules are dictated by adat
tradition. One such rule is that decision-making should be by consensus. Nowadays, such
collective-choice rules may be written down together with sasi’s operational rules.

Overall Discussion and Conclusions 261

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