Appendix C. Equivalence
„ , ri τ2 , -τ3 11 . 1. . 1 , r. , 1
Proof. kn, kn and kn are all implicitly defined by
for t = 2,.., n. Hence, the implicit conditions are identical for all three versions of the multi-market
game and the entry-deterring capacity is the same. ■
∂ V
∂x1yl
∂ V
(≡, βe (X)) - d
kk - x ∖
’ 0r0
(21)
30
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