Strategic Investment and Market Integration



Appendix C. Equivalence

„      , ri τ2      , -τ3          11 .     1. . 1    , r. , 1

Proof. kn, kn and kn are all implicitly defined by
for
t = 2,.., n. Hence, the implicit conditions are identical for all three versions of the multi-market
game and the entry-deterring capacity is the same. ■

V
∂x1yl


V

(, βe (X)) - d


kk - x

0r0


(21)


30



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