CESifo Working Paper No. 2004
Migrating Football Players, Transfer
Fees and Migration Controls
Abstract
Since the famous Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 transfer fees for
football players after moving to another club have become suspect as they are considered as
an obstacle to the free movement of workers. However, in an unrestricted market free
migration from football players will be Pareto efficient under special circumstances only. This
paper shows that transfer fees can correct inefficient migration flows from small to large
football leagues. Home-grown rules that prescribe that a certain proportion of the roster of
players should be trained within the club are very blunt devices for restoring efficiency, and
perform worse than transfer fee systems.
JEL Code: H77, J61, L83.
Keywords: football transfers, migration equilibrium, social welfare.
Harrie A. A. Verbon
Tilburg University
Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
9 May 2007
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