Nonlinear Production, Abatement, Pollution and Materials Balance Reconsidered



20

(i) Suppose, that λ1 ,λ2 ,λc,λf,λt, λm, λx and λy are the values attained by the Lagrange
multipliers in the solution to (20) and that the partial derivatives X
e and Rhj for j = 1, 2 and
h
= £,m are also evaluated at that solution. Set prices pt = λf>,pm = λm,py = λy and con-
sider the alternative tax schemes A and B:

-Aisdefinedby:  tA = λ1, t ; = λ1, tcA = λc, tA = λxXe and tA = tAA = 0 ;

-Bisdefinedby:  tB = tB2 = 0, tCB = λc, teB = λxXe +j λjRe , t£ = Σ j λ-R  and

tmB =jλjRmj .

With these prices and either tax scheme A or tax scheme B all markets clear and the equilib-
rium allocation is efficient.

(ii) When the tax scheme A is implemented, the efficient tax rates satisfy

tA ʃ > 1 Y
t
e {<} y


Xr 0 and/or Xr 0 and Xr = 0,
ra1ra2rc


=Xr=0,
rc


(28)


X=X=0 and X>0.

ra1         ra2                      rc

To prove Proposition 4i insert the prices and tax rates as assigned in Proposition 4 into (27)
and verify that this substitution makes (27) coincide with (21). The tax scheme
A in Proposi-
tion 4i is a pure emissions tax scheme in the sense that a tax is levied on the emission of
each
polluting residual, while non-emission items like the inputs labor and material are not taxed.
We infer from (21) that (in equilibrium) with the tax scheme
A all tax rates are set equal to the
marginal environmental damage of the respective residuals15:

(29)


tA = MD X : = -x . v for v = e,ra,ra ,c
vxv    i i        a1a2

Uy

We also know that if abatement takes place, optimal emissions tax rates need to equal mar-
ginal abatement costs. In our model production residuals are the only residuals subject to
abatement. Therefore we will now focus on those residuals. Invoking (27b) we obtain, after
some rearrangement of terms,

teA=Ye-taAjRej-tcAYe.                                                             (30)

ee  aece

15 To simplify the comparison of marginal conditions characterizing either efficient allocations or market alloca-
tions we measure all prices and tax rates in terms of the consumer good by setting
py 1 .



More intriguing information

1. Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls
2. The name is absent
3. A multistate demographic model for firms in the province of Gelderland
4. The name is absent
5. he Virtual Playground: an Educational Virtual Reality Environment for Evaluating Interactivity and Conceptual Learning
6. The name is absent
7. Permanent and Transitory Policy Shocks in an Empirical Macro Model with Asymmetric Information
8. Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs
9. Gender stereotyping and wage discrimination among Italian graduates
10. The name is absent