6 References
1. Ash, Robert B. (1972): “Real Analysis and Probability,” Academic Press, New York.
2. Balder, Erik J. (1988): “Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete
Information,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 13, 265-276.
3. Crawford, Vincent P. and Sobel, Joel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission,”
Econometrica, 50, 1431-1451.
4. Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1991): “Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequen-
tial Equilibrium,” Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 236-260.
5. Harsanyi, John C. (1967-68): “Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian
Players,” Part I-III, Management Science, 14, 159-182, 320-334, and 486-502.
6. Jung, HanjoonM. (2009): “Strategic Information Transmission: Comments,”Working
paper.
7. Jung, Hanjoon M. (2010): “Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative,”
Working paper.
8. Kreps, David M. and Wilson, Robert (1982): “Sequential Equilibria,” Econometrica,
50, 863-894.
9. Kreps, David M. and Ramey, Garey (1987): “Structural Consistency, Consistency, and
Sequential Rationality,” Econometrica, 55, 1331-1348.
27