Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
|
2001______________________ |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
Obs. |
|
MOU incoming (in tsd.) |
41.9 |
26.2 |
0 |
132.7 |
143 |
|
termination rate (in cent/min.) |
0.328 |
0.339 |
0.102 |
1.240 |
163 |
|
capex (in mio.) |
168.4 |
216.4 |
38 |
931 |
20 |
|
market share |
0.301 |
0.173 |
0.005 |
0.713 |
212 |
|
market size (in tsd.) |
17704.7 |
18072.4 |
2508.0 |
56108.0 |
212 |
|
share urban population |
0.741 |
0.113 |
0.551 |
0.972 |
236 |
|
post paid (in tsd. subscr.)* |
3154.5 |
3501.7 |
283 |
11770 |
26 |
|
cost regulation |
0.068 |
0.252 |
0 |
1 |
236 |
|
price/rev. cap regulation |
0.136 |
0.343 |
0 |
1 |
236 |
|
regulation netmonopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
236 |
|
GSM 1800______________ |
0.102 |
0.303 |
0 |
1 |
236 |
|
2007____________________ |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
Obs. |
|
MOU incoming (in tsd.) |
61.0 |
30.0 |
0 |
166.1 |
120 |
|
termination rate (in cent/min.) |
0.220 |
0.251 |
0.057 |
0.990 |
148 |
|
capex (in mio.) |
103.7 |
80.6 |
14 |
379 |
138 |
|
market share |
0.293 |
0.147 |
0.031 |
0.625 |
156 |
|
market size (in tsd.) |
30235.2 |
32120.4 |
4589 |
93292.0 |
153 |
|
share urban population |
0.753 |
0.110 |
0.589 |
0.973 |
177 |
|
post paid (in tsd. subscr.) |
3005.4 |
3691.5 |
82 |
15669 |
156 |
|
cost regulation |
0.305 |
0.462 |
0 |
1 |
177 |
|
price/rev. cap regulation |
0.339 |
0.475 |
0 |
1 |
177 |
|
regulation netmonopoly |
0.356 |
0.480 |
0 |
1 |
177 |
|
GSM 1800______________ |
0.102 |
0.303 |
0 |
1 |
177 |
* 2002
their mobile phone only if no cheeper fixed line phone was available.16 Finally, lower
off-net costs might be a driver for the increase of traffic as a decrease in calling costs is
probably passed on to customers which is also the standard assumption in theoretical
models.
The high 2001 observations of capex might be driven by an outlier group in the data
set as in the following years investments between 95 and 120 million Euros have been
observed. Thus, the exceptionally high average investment level in 2001 is probably
not (only) due to the auctioning of or beauty-contests for UMTS licenses. Moreover, it
might be induced by missing data on smaller countries for the year 2001.
Concerning market shares we find a slight reduction in market concentrations what is the
target of termination regulation. Nevertheless, we do not know whether the reduction
in concentration is driven by tougher regulation or whether the reduction goes only in
hand with a reduction in variability, also be seen from the standard deviation.
An overview over the expected estimation outcomes is given in table 3. From the theo-
16 See e.g. Ward and Woroch (2004).
19
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