Table 4: Estimation Results
|
log(term. rate) |
OLS |
3SLS |
OLS |
3SLS |
OLS |
3SLS |
|
log(capex) |
-0.025 ** |
-0.047 ** |
-0.026 * |
-0.044 ** | ||
|
( 0.012 ) |
( 0.020 ) |
( 0.014 ) |
( 0.021 ) | |||
|
log(weighted av. capex) |
-0.042 *** |
-0.066 *** |
-0.035 *** |
-0.061 *** | ||
|
( 0.011 ) |
( 0.023 ) |
( 0.012 ) |
( 0.023 ) | |||
|
log(market share) |
-0.155 *** |
-0.147 *** |
-0.184 *** |
-0.165 *** |
-0.173 *** |
-0.154 *** |
|
( 0.014 ) |
( 0.026 ) |
( 0.015 ) |
( 0.026 ) |
( 0.015 ) |
( 0.027 ) | |
|
log(market size) |
0.251 *** |
0.196 |
0.186 ** |
0.145 |
0.229 ** |
0.192 |
|
( 0.096 ) |
( 0.170 ) |
( 0.089 ) |
( 0.170 ) |
( 0.096 ) |
( 0.171 ) | |
|
log(share urban pop.) |
-4.679 *** |
-8.860 ** |
-3.426 * |
-7.862 * |
-3.502 * |
-7.574 * |
|
( 1.678 ) |
( 4.252 ) |
( 2.067 ) |
( 4.489 ) |
( 2.050 ) |
( 4.465 ) | |
|
cost-based regulation |
0.138 * |
0.124 ** |
0.097 |
0.123 ** |
0.101 |
0.130 ** |
|
( 0.075 ) |
( 0.053 ) |
( 0.068 ) |
( 0.053 ) |
( 0.068 ) |
( 0.053 ) | |
|
incentive regulation |
0.090 *** |
0.062 |
0.094 *** |
0.053 |
0.097 *** |
0.057 |
|
( 0.025 ) |
( 0.042 ) |
( 0.024 ) |
( 0.043 ) |
( 0.024 ) |
( 0.043 ) | |
|
netmonopoly reg. |
0.009 |
-0.037 |
-0.020 |
-0.051 |
-0.015 |
-0.048 |
|
( 0.023 ) |
( 0.045 ) |
( 0.022 ) |
( 0.047 ) |
( 0.022 ) |
( 0.047 ) | |
|
GSM 1800 |
0.103 *** |
0.109 *** |
0.103 *** |
0.124 *** |
0.094 *** |
0.115 *** |
|
( 0.018 ) |
( 0.039 ) |
( 0.017 ) |
( 0.039 ) |
( 0.017 ) |
( 0.039 ) | |
|
constant |
-3.146 *** |
-- |
-2.294 *** |
-- |
-2.563 *** |
— |
|
( 0.752 ) |
-- |
( 0.736 ) |
-- |
( 0.744 ) |
— | |
|
country dummies included | ||||||
|
year dummies included | ||||||
|
# Obs. |
799 |
510 |
731 |
500 |
799 |
500 |
|
F (df) |
1263.5 (28) |
47046.9 (26) |
1390.5 (27) |
45985.5 (26) |
1263.5 (28) |
46401.4 (27) |
|
"R2"__________________ |
0.955 |
0.949 |
0.957 |
0.950 |
0.955 |
0.950 |
|
log(MOU inc.) |
Ols |
3SLS |
Ols |
3SLS |
OlS |
3SLS |
|
(1 b) |
(2 b) |
(3 b) |
(4 b) |
(5 b) |
(6 b) | |
|
log(capex) |
0.009 |
-0.002 |
0.005 |
-0.009 | ||
|
( 0.008 ) |
( 0.012 ) |
( 0.008 ) |
( 0.013 ) | |||
|
log(weighted av. capex) |
0.045 *** |
0.037 *** |
0.053 *** |
0.036 *** | ||
|
( 0.012 ) |
( 0.014 ) |
( 0.009 ) |
( 0.014 ) | |||
|
log(term. rate) |
0.008 |
-0.203 |
-0.058 *** |
-0.248 * |
0.021 |
-0.271 * |
|
( 0.015 ) |
( 0.158 ) |
( 0.022 ) |
( 0.147 ) |
( 0.017 ) |
( 0.160 ) | |
|
log(market share) |
0.969 *** |
0.937 *** |
1.237 *** |
0.940 *** |
0.985 *** |
0.940 *** |
|
( 0.014 ) |
( 0.024 ) |
( 0.018 ) |
( 0.025 ) |
( 0.014 ) |
( 0.025 ) | |
|
log(market size) |
0.122 ** |
0.137 * |
-0.190 ** |
0.131 * |
0.125 ** |
0.143 * |
|
( 0.056 ) |
( 0.074 ) |
( 0.081 ) |
( 0.076 ) |
( 0.064 ) |
( 0.079 ) | |
|
log(share urban pop.) |
-7.302 *** |
-8.466 *** |
-9.833 *** |
-9.336 *** |
-8.067 *** |
-9.408 *** |
|
( 0.920 ) |
( 1.574 ) |
( 1.380 ) |
( 1.525 ) |
( 1.064 ) |
( 1.587 ) | |
|
post paid |
0.000 *** |
0.000 *** |
-0.000 ** |
0.000 *** |
0.000 *** |
0.000 *** |
|
( 0.000 ) |
( 0.000 ) |
( 0.000 ) |
( 0.000 ) |
( 0.000 ) |
( 0.000 ) | |
|
cost-based regulation |
-0.005 |
0.021 |
0.049 * |
0.024 |
-0.008 |
0.029 |
|
( 0.018 ) |
( 0.031 ) |
( 0.026 ) |
( 0.030 ) |
( 0.020 ) |
( 0.032 ) | |
|
incentive regulation |
0.024 |
0.036 ** |
0.081 *** |
0.046 ** |
0.033 ** |
0.049 ** |
|
( 0.018 ) |
( 0.021 ) |
( 0.021 ) |
( 0.021 ) |
( 0.016 ) |
( 0.022 ) | |
|
netmonopoly reg. |
0.060 *** |
0.050 ** |
0.099 *** |
0.062 *** |
0.077 *** |
0.062 *** |
|
( 0.016 ) |
( 0.022 ) |
( 0.023 ) |
( 0.023 ) |
( 0.018 ) |
( 0.024 ) | |
|
constant |
0.382 |
-- |
1.769 |
-- |
0.062 |
— |
|
( 0.683 ) |
-- |
( 1.099 ) |
-- |
( 0.771 ) |
— | |
|
country dummies included | ||||||
|
year dummies included | ||||||
|
# Obs. |
510 |
510 |
500 |
500 |
500 |
500 |
|
F (df) |
742.2 (26) |
955946.2 (27) |
740.9 (26) |
877385.2 (27) |
713.2 (27) |
12659.96 (27) |
|
"R2"__________________ |
0.972 |
0.965 |
0.975 |
0.963 |
0.975 |
0.961 |
***,**,* signal the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels.
Std. errors are provided in brackets.
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