plained by its need for access to such resources (Gulati, 1999; Harrigan, 1988; Nohria &
Garcia-Pont, 1991). Das and Teng note: “A resource-based view seems particularly ap-
propriate for examining strategic alliances because firms essentially use alliances to gain
access to other firms’ valuable resources” (2000: 32-33).
2.1 Criteria for Partner Selection in Current Literature
The starting point of transaction cost analysis is not whom to partner with but rather how
a particular exchange should be organized given certain exchange partners and exchange
attributes (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Confronted with the partner selection choice, trans-
action cost theory suggests that firms choose allies by a comparative assessment of trans-
action costs involved in the specific relation. Implicitly, partner choice derives from
economizing on the cost of contracting considering future contingencies. The resource-
based view provides insights about what kind of resources that may form the basis for an
alliance and suggests that firms will benefit from allying with the firm holding the
strongest complementary resources (e.g. Miotti & Sachwald, 2003), which can include
various kinds from physical equipment over knowledge to reputational assets. In addition
to seeking attractive partners, the firm must also itself have strong resource endowments
(Kogut, Shan and Walker, 1992; Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994; Ahuja, 2000). Hence,
firms should conduct a comparative assessment of potential complementary partners’ re-
source bases and subsequently choose the strongest. The costs associated with accessing
resources also matter, and firm will therefore choose the partner, who provides the best
cost/benefit relation.
Various other views on partner selection has emerged (Geringer, 1991; Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978; Podolny, 1994; Saxon, 1997; Stuart, 1998). Among these a social per-
spective, following Granovetter’s (1985) critique of static efficiency theories in terms of
“undersocialializing” the partner selection aspect, has recently received support. Gulati
(1995) finds that prior alliances create ties that directly and indirectly influences the
choice of partners. Similarly, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) find that the probability of a
new alliance between two specific firms increases with their interdependence, their prior
ties, common third parties and their centrality in the alliance network. Li & Rowley
(2002) find that in addition to different evaluation criteria, inertia plays an important role