Discussion Papers 745
6 Regression analysis
player’s effort. This is also reflected in the relatively high and statistically significant (one-tail
test) constant for the high-cost players. While high-cost players always have an interest in
team remuneration, it is interesting for the low-cost players only if they manage to cooperate
with the high-cost player.
Table 2
Choice of team remuneration in VOLUNTARY SYM and ASYM treatments
(Random effects probits)
|
SYM |
ASYM | |||
|
Low cost |
High cost | |||
|
[1] |
[2] |
[1] | ||
|
Constant |
0.216 |
0.550 |
0.151 |
1.219* |
|
(0.375) |
(0.577) |
(0.367) |
(0.725) | |
|
1st period |
-0.187 |
-1.225* | ||
|
(0.505) |
(0.687) | |||
|
Last 5 periods |
-0.581* |
-0.037 | ||
|
(0.273) |
(1.05) | |||
|
Partner’s effort below a |
0.293 |
-0.244 |
-0.976 | |
|
strategic level |
(0.347) |
(0.615) |
(0.727) | |
|
Partner’s effort above a |
___ ⅛ ⅛ 1.325 |
0.867* |
1.225** |
0.999* |
|
strategic level |
(0.387) |
(0.293) |
(0.146) |
(0.475) |
|
ρa |
, _ _* * |
0.385a ** |
__* * |
0.231a * |
|
Loglikelihood |
-195.045 |
-82,647 |
-85.409 |
-52.606 |
|
Nobs |
480 |
240 |
240 |
240 |
|
*Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; one- or two-tail tests, whenever appropriate. ( ) Standard-error. a : Likelihood ratio test. | ||||
6.2 Effort
The determinants of the effort level (in the range of 0 to 100) are reported using panel regres-
sions with fixed effects for individuals and periods. Assuming fixed effects for periods and
strategic first-period and end-game effects being unlikely to play a role in private remunerati-
on, we disregard the “1st period” and “last 5 periods” dummies from these regressions. To
take the remuneration mode into account, we include the dummy variable “team mode” which
is equal to “1” if the group is in the team remuneration mode when the effort is chosen or “0”
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