Voluntary Teaming and Effort



Discussion Papers 745

6 Regression analysis

Table 4

Choice of effort level in the ENFORCED SYM and ASYM treatments

(Least squares with fixed effect for individuals and periods)

SYM

ASYM

Low cost

High cost

Constant

_ _ * *

35.339

26.872*

_ ___r . * *

15.954

(0.7463)

(2.046)

(2.419)

Effort of the partner

___⅛⅝

0.2482

0.1486*

0.4380

(0.0483)

(0.0626)

(0.0722)

R2

0.297

0.395

0.563

Nobs

480

240

240

* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; ( ) Standard-error.

The fact that players do not reciprocate the previous team effort of their partner probably
results from the first step of the game: once the players have decided for team remuneration,
this has a signaling effect implying that they cooperate at a level they think is a reasonable
point of cooperation.

The results in the ENFORCED teaming treatments support this explanation. When teaming is
enforced, the reciprocity variable “effort of the partner” has a significantly positive effect on
the effort. Note that this result does not necessarily contradict the non-parametric result that
reciprocity is mostly insignificant in the
ASYM treatments (with the exception of the low-cost
players under
VOLUNTARY teaming). The non-parametric tests are conservative and concern
the direction rather than the intensity of the reaction to other’s effort. Thus, the increase (dec-
rease) in units of effort given an increase (decrease) in the partner’s effort appears to be signi-
ficant although we observe almost equal numbers of increases and decreases.

The predicted team effort levels, taking the partner’s previous team effort at mean values, are
in all enforced treatments lower than in the respective voluntary teaming treatment. For ex-
ample, the predicted effort in the regression for the
ENFORCED SYM treatment is 44.2 and,
thus, lower than the effort level predicted for the
VOLUNTARY SYM treatment.

26



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