The Advantage of Cooperatives under Asymmetric Cost Information



The investor owned (IO) monopsonist’s contract design problem can there-
fore be formulated as the general problem (P) with the following more spe-
cific objective

n                        n

G'o(q,s) = ∑Eclj>-⅛(c) -si(c)) = ∑Eci (p∙⅛(ci) -βj(ci))
t=l                                t=≈l

We see that the processor’s objective - as the constraints - depends only on
average production and payments. Also, the objective - as the constraints -
are effectively separable in farmer specific problems.

Using Proposition 1, we shall now characterize the solution to this prob-
lem. Assume that (s(.), g(.)) is a feasible solution and let ci = sup{ci]¾(ci) >
0}. By the first property in Proposition 1, gi(ci) > O for all
ci < ⅛ and
¾(ci) = O for all ci
Ci. Also, it follows from the monopsonist interest in
reducing payment that si(ci) -
ci ∙ qi(ci) = O.2 Using the second property in
Proposition 1, we therefore have

Si(ci) = ci ∙ qi(ci) + / qi(ci)dci Vci,i
Jci

Substituting this into the objective function and using partial integration,
we get

Gjo⅛,s) =52/ (p-⅛(Ci)-ci∙qi(ci)- [ qi(ci) dcλ fi(ci) dci

*=ιjc< ×                       Λ⅛          /

≈ Σ /    ” ci)¾(ci)Λ(ci) ~          <*⅛

i=l *'ci'

This objective must be maximized subject to the constraints that production
levels are weakly decreasing, i.e. Vt,eJ,cJ' : cj > c" => ¾(c⅛) ≤ ⅞(c⅛'), and
that they do not exceed the capacities, i.e. Vi, ci : O ≤ ¾(ci) ≤ gfz.

This is easy, however, if we inwoke a bit of regularity on the cost distri-
butions. Specifically, we will assume that the cost distributions have weakly
increasing hazard rate, i.e. Fi(ci)∕∕i(ci) is weakly increasing on [cf, cf] for

2By IR si(ci) - ci - ρi(ci) > O. Now if si(ci) - ci ∙ gi(ci) = ε > O, we also have
si(ci) — ɑt, 9i(c⅛) ≥ ε Vci
Ci since the producer’s expected profit is decreasing in the
cost type, cf the proof of Proposition 1. In this case, the contract could be improved by
reducing payments with ε for all ci ≤ ci. This would not affect the IC constraints.

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