The name is absent

Table 2.5 Robustness with Respect to the SFAs. Baseline Models

Note: '***' significant at 1%; '**' significant at 5%, '*' significant at 10%
Source: European Commission for EU15 and OECD for US and Japan.

Alternatively, model (2.10) has been re-estimated by re-calculating the stock of debt net
of SFAs to obtain the stock of debt that would have prevailed had the SFAs been zero.
The results are shown in Table 2.5 in the rows labeled 'NDEBT'. Leaving aside the fact
that the reactions of the 'gross primary surplus' to gross debt tend to be higher than that of
the standard primary surplus, be it to gross or 'net' debt, the main conclusions of Table 2.3
remain unaltered.

Finally, the main conclusions of Table 2.3 also remain when a country-specific selection
model is carried out, so that for each country the model with the best adjustment power
and the least misspecification error is chosen, as shown in Table 2.6.⁹

Notice that some models (Belgium, France, Italy, see Table 2.6) include an intervention in 1993 (i.e.
a variable that takes value 1 in that year 0 elsewhere) with no significant impacts as regards the
reaction of the primary surplus to debt levels. This intervention tries to deal with a large increase in
debt levels observed in many countries in 1993, which appear to be associated to the application of
the statistical regulations adopted in connection with the fiscal Maastricht criteria with a view to
providing rigorous criteria to compile deficit and debt levels in the Member States. As shown by the
large SFAs recorded that year, such debt increases were not associated to increases in the deficit

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