Proceedings from the ECFIN Workshop "The budgetary implications of structural reforms" - Brussels, 2 December 2005



Table 10: Budget balances and pension reforms: results from the estimation of fiscal rules (see table 1 for
sample definition)

Dependent
variables
Explanatory
variables

Primary

CAB

Cyclically-
adjusted
government
revenues

Primary
government
expenditure

Constant

-2.48***

8.14***

4.99***

(-4.40)

(5.54)

(2.85)

Lagged dependent

0.71***

0.78***

0.91***

variable

(17.57)

(21.89)

(22.76)

Output gap

-0.003

0.14***

0.14***

(-0.08)

(3.65)

(2.86)

Lagged debt/GDP

0.048***

0.034***

-0.018**

ratio

(5.5)

(4.21)

(-2.18)

Dummy     for

-0.24

-0.22

-0.05

pension reform

(-1.18)

(-1.3)

(-0.24)

N. obs.

224

224

224

R sq.

0.69

0.79

0.73

Chi sq

1128

405731

255782

Notes: Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables regression. The
output gap is instrumented with its own lag and the US lagged output gap. All
fiscal variables are expressed as shares on potential output.

Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively,
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. Coefficients for country fixed
effects are not reported.

The pension reform dummy is constructed as an indicator taking value 1 if a
pension reform was carried out in the current or previous year and zero
otherwise.

Source: Authors’ calculation on data described in table 1 and DG ECFIN AMECO database.

128



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