her consent.107 NGOs are thus allowed to assist complainants in their communications.108 Never-
theless, the HRC has been flexible on the wording and also allowed groups of individuals alleg-
ing a violation to file a joint communication with the HRC against States Parties to the FOP109 -
thus joinders are permitted.110 This allows for the grouping of communications, but without legal
effect for the authors - i.e. this is just a provision for judicial economy, but does not represent a
broadening of the standing requirement. More difficult is the question of group complaints as
defined in this article. According to the jurisdiction of the HRC it is not clear whether individuals
may be represented by a group, even if they did not consent to the communication personally.111
If this were the case, it could be assumed that some form of group complaint would be permitted,
as views would entail a legal consequence for all members of the group as a whole. But the HRC
always made clear that a group as such may not file a communication. This issue arose especially
with respect to Art. 27 CCPR. The HRC views this article as establishing a right which is con-
ferred solely on individuals belonging to minority groups and which is distinct from a group
right.112 Therefore, only individuals may complain about the infringement of a minority right113 -
an institutional arrangement which is not conducive to complaints, as this may amount to a
costly gathering of victims and thus constitutes an immense hurdle for bringing a case. Also, the
free-rider argument applies forcefully in those constellations.
The victim requirement is generally indispensable for admissibility, thus neither altruistic NGO
complaints on behalf of victims nor actio popularis114 is admitted. It requires that the complain-
ant is personally and directly affected by the existing law, policy, practice, act or omission of the
State Party; abstract violations are deemed insufficient.115 For a person to claim to be a victim of
a violation of a right protected by the Covenant, she must show either that an act or an omission
107 In contrast with the ECtHR, an NGO cannot submit a communication to the HRC. See A group of
associations for the defence of the rights of disabled and handicapped persons in Italy v. Italy,
Communication No. 163/1984 (1984), U.N. GAOR 39th. Sess., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40) at 197
(1984), at para. 6.2.
108 See e.g. Acuna Inostroza et al. v. Chile, Communication No. 717/1996, UN GAOR 54th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Vol. II, U. N. Doc. (A/54/40) at 313 (2000).
109 E. W. et al. v. Netherlands, Communication No 429/1990, UN GAOR 48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, U.
N. Doc. (A/48/40) at 198 (1993), at para. 6.3.: „provided each of the authors is a victim within the meaning
of article 1 of the Optional Protocol, nothing precludes large numbers of persons from bringing a case under
the Optional Protocol. The mere fact of large numbers of petitioners does not render their communication an
actio popularis, and the Committee finds that the communication does not fail on this ground.“
110 Rule 88 (2) HRC Rules of Procedure.
111 See Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, Communication No. 78/1980, U.N. GAOR 39th. Sess., U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40) at 200 (1984), where the Committee seemingly accepted a communication from the
Chief Captain of the Mikmaq tribal society, provided that he was able to produce a written authorization from
the tribal Grand Council, but did not request that each member of the tribe submit a communication himself.
Thus, a representing body of a defined group may suffice. Nevertheless, this case may be an exception
insofar as tribal societies represent a closed group and are thus defined by ethnic or cultural criteria, whereas
a class action does define the group by potential violation and is thus generally open ended.
112 General Comment No. 23, supra note 100, at 3.1.
113 Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. GAOR 45th.
Sess., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at 1 (1990), at para. 32.1.
114 E. W. et al. v. Netherlands, supra note 109, at para. 6.4., where the HRC considered whether the authors are
victims within the meaning of the OP. As this was not the case for nuclear threat in the Netherlands in the
view of the HRC, it therefore found the communication inadmissible under Art. 1 of the FOP.
115 Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to that basic principle. There are some situations, where the HRC
permitted a third party close to the victim to submit a communication.
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