of a State Party has already adversely affected her enjoyment of such right, or that such an effect
is imminent. It is not sufficient simply to challenge a law or State policy or practice abstractly.
Nevertheless, this requirement is softened by the consideration of potential violations. The HRC
received a number of communications, in which violations have not actually occurred but in
which the author alleged they would occur in the future. This may be in case (1) that the concrete
application of a law or practice constitutes a violation of CCPR, or (2) that the domestic legisla-
tion by its mere existence directly violates the petitioner’s right. It should be noted that the char-
acter of a decision concerning the latter instance amounts to a greater collective good than the
former, as we find an abstract revision of an existing law as such and therefore the obligation of
the state to change the law, whereas in the former case, the consideration of the HRC might just
amount to the review of an application of the law. The HRC has been rather reluctant in admit-
ting cases, where a violation by the law is not directly imminent and held hypothetical events not
permissible.116 Future violations must be foreseeable and imminent. This is mostly the case,
where the law is imminent to be applied, e.g. in cases of extradition or death penalty.117 The
HRC also considered an individual to be a victim if a law or practice is applicable in such a way
that the alleged victim’s risk of being affected is more than a theoretical possibility, i.e. if the
victim is already affected by the law even in the absence of any individual measure of implemen-
tation.118 The HRC also admitted communications which challenged domestic legislation, which
directly violated the petitioner’s rights by its mere existence.119
In spite of the sometimes broad interpretation of the victim requirement, the restriction concern-
ing groups and NGOs seems overcautious, especially in the light of the substantive provisions of
the CCPR, that is Arts. 1 (self-determination), 18 (religion), 21 (freedom of assembly), 22 (free-
dom of association), and last but not least Art. 27 (minority rights), which are all rights that have
per se a collective good aspect as they may only be exercised within a group. True, the gate to
standing may be opened further by gathering all potential victims, but depending on the circum-
stances that may amount to a de facto impossibility, as it will be either impossible or too costly
for the individual to gather all those affected. Furthermore, this restrictive interpretation by the
HRC excludes all peoples, minorities, churches, parties, and legal persons.120
Concerning the enforcement measure, the HRC often indicates what an appropriate remedy
would be, like for instance the payment of compensation or the release from detention. In the
event of a failure by the State Party to take appropriate steps, the case is referred to a member of
the HRC, the Special Rapporteur on Follow-up of Views, for consideration of further measures
to be taken. The Special Rapporteur may, for example, issue specific requests to the State Party
116 See A. R. S. v. Canada, Communication No. 91/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 29 (1984), at para. 5.1. et
seq.
117 Charles Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, UN GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, U.
N. Doc. (A/49/40) at 189 (1994).
118 See S. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian Women v. Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978,
U.N.GAOR 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 134 (1981), at para. 91.
119 See A group of associations for the defence of the rights of disabled and handicapped persons in Italy v. Italy,
supra note 107, at para. 6.2.
120 With a similar view, Nowak, supra note 103, at 5 et seq.
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