I. Introduction
Unfortunately, we do not live in the best of all human rights worlds. This raises the question of
potential causes of the current situation and how it can be improved. The article deals with ius
standi provisions in international human rights law (hereinafter IHRL), argues that they are not
effectively designed from an individual complainants’ point of view and proposes a broadening
of ius standi provisions as one potential means of improvement.
Questions pertaining to human rights first arise at the domestic level between the state and the
individuals under its jurisdiction. States are the main addressees of human rights obligations.2
Where national protection fails, individuals may bring their complaints before international bod-
ies. A growing number of international bodies with jurisdiction to protect individuals against
human rights violations committed by states within their own jurisdiction have been created.3 It
is sometimes claimed that we are living through a “human rights revolution in progress”,4 in
which (i) the recognition of the objective character of obligations to protect human rights,5 (ii)
the acceptance of a collective guarantee of compliance with these obligations and last but not
least (iii) the right of individual complaints are all crucial parts. Nevertheless, it is also true that
the institutions for the enforcement of human rights are still rather weak. Empirical research6
2 Nearly all countries, especially in Eastern Europe have incorporated IHRL in their legal orders. The
European Convention, for example, is law of the land in most European countries. Thus, they may also be
enforced by national courts and become effective in that way. For a short overview on the interplay between
IHRL and national law, see Ralph Steinhardt, “The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International
Human Rights Law”, in: Hurst Hannum (ed.), Guide to International Human Rights Practice, 2004, Ardsley,
NY, 267-289.
3 Courts, commissions and committees are all dealt with together as they all allow for individual complaint
mechanisms. Commissions and committees are not judicial bodies in the proper sense as they issue only non-
binding decisions. In the text, the term “judicial body” is used to include all of them. Furthermore,
compliance with decisions does not necessarily depend on their binding nature.
4 Thomas Buergenthal et al., International Human Rights in a Nutshell, 2002, St. Paul, at 24.
5 Human rights treaties are distinct from other treaties, which are characterized by mutual and reciprocal
concessions and obligations, in that human rights treaties find inspiration in considerations of a superior
order, the ordre public. In creating obligations for states vis-à-vis human beings under their jurisdiction, the
norms of these treaties not only require States Parties to take joint action for human rights protection (i.e.,
through the exercise of a collective guarantee), but also, and above all, oblige each State Party to provide an
internal legal order to enforce these rights, in relations between the public power and the individual. See
instead of many Hermann Mosler, “The Protection of Human Rights by International Legal Procedure”,
Georgetown Law Journal 52 (1964), 800-823, at 818 et seq. considering the function of the European
Commission. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Commission (IACHR)
understand the respective human rights treaties not only as a reciprocal treaty between states but as an
objective order. The ECtHR stated in Ireland v. The United Kingdom (Appl. No. 5310/71), 25 Eur.Ct. H.R
(ser. A) (1978), Judgment of 18 January 1978, at para. 239 that: "...unlike international treaties of the classic
kind, the Convention comprises more than merely reciprocal engagements between Contracting States. It
creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral relationships, objective obligations, which, in the
words of the Preamble, benefit from a "collective enforcement". Likewise the I/A Court H.R., The Effect of
Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-
2/82 of September 24, 1982, at para. 29. More generally for different types of treaties, see Gerald
Fitzmaurice, “Second Report on the Law of Treaties”, UN doc. A/CN.4/107, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, Vol. II , 16-70 (1957), at 54 et seq. called those obligations “integral”. See for this
distinction also Joost Pauwelyn, “A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations”, European Journal of
International Law 14 (2003), 907-951, at 933 especially for IHR Treaties.
6 Oana A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, Yale Law Journal 111 (2002), 1935-
2042. In substance not different, see Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve
Respect for Human Rights?, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006), forthcoming. His findings suggest that