Thus the range of ∣∣fh is — i-ɪ. and 0 in presence of an ultra-conservative (βh → ∞Lβp →
∞) and populist CB (βH → ∞Vβp → ∞) respectively. In the case of a MU, the elasticity
of money supply to union-wide wages is given by
_ (1 — a)βu
^u 1 к + βu (1 — ■ '
whose range spanned by CBC is (—ββ, 1) . The impact of CBC on μu is
dμu ___k(1 — qQ < о
dβu~ [к + (1 — o)2β u ]2 .
A typical union first order condition. The typical union i maximizes (15) with
respect to ω⅛ subject to (4) and (29), taking as given profits, Di, and the nominal wages
set by other unions at Home and abroad. Note that individual union dividend flows are
Di _ Pfr^-(1 — a). In a symmetric equilibrium in which all Di are the same, profit per
union is
Di _ PhYh(1 — «) _ (1 — a)PCi.
From the budget constraint (4), we obtain for all domestic firms
PCi _ WiLi + (1 — ∏ )/'C
so that aPCjι _ WiLi. The first order condition with respect to ω⅛ yields
d log Wi
'>( ,--------------
dωi
d log P +
dωi
d log Li
dωi
-hrm 1ι-d 1 dC^ — WL (dlo≡ Wi dl°gp I
where we used C~ d^L _ -pc^" d,:---dL~ +
sion (47) by d l°((w — d d°,βP and using the real
yields equation (35). ■
) + к log Li d^0gLi _0 (47)
dωi
d l°gL* ] and ɪpeɪ _ ɑ. Dividing expres-
wage elasticity definition η ≡ — dl°g Р
d d , d lθg ^^
Analysis of CBC and macroeconomic outcome. From equation (36) and (37), it
appears that the value of labor demand elasticity is mainly determined by the elasticity of
money supply to nominal wages. According to the degree of CBC, the range of 1 — μHH is
k+βp θp,
(1-a)βp θ f I ʌ'θ,v
0 and
in the case of ultra-populist and ultra-conservative CB respectively.
Similarly 1 —μu is equal to 0 and ɪ-^ in presence of an ultra-populist and ultra-conservative
CB respectively. When 1 — μHH _ 0 and 1 — μu _ 0, i.e. in presence of an ultra-liberal
domestic CB, the elasticity of labor demand is σ in both regimes. When the CB is ultra-
31