Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair Division Problems



730


C.-J. Haake et al.

Table 1. Players’ bids for bundles

Bi

B2

B3

______B4

P1

[50

20

10

20

P2

60

^40

15

10

P3

0

40

[25

35

P4

50

35

10

[30

Initial payment

50

40

25

30

Table 2. The initial assessment matrix

P1

P2

P3

P4

P1

0

-20

-15

-10

P2

10

0

-10

-20

P3

-50

0

0

5

P4

0

-5

-15

0

Discounts

0

0

0

0

Table 3. The modified assessment matrix

P1

P2

P3

P4

P1

0

-10

-10

-10

P2

10

10

-5

-20

P3

-50

10

5

5

P4

0

5

-10

0

Discounts

0

10

5

0

the diagonal entry from each column. In Table 2, row i then shows Player
i ’s assessment of Player j’s bundle. We keep track of discounts in a separate
row.

The assessment matrix in Table 2 shows (by comparing entries in each
row) that Player 2 envies Player 1 (a
22 a21) and Player 3 envies Player 4
(a33
a34). Therefore we must compensate Player 2 by giving her a discount
of 10, and Player 3 a discount of 5. To recalculate the assessment matrix, we
may add 10 to column 2 and add 5 to column 3. The new assessment matrix
is given in Table 3.

Now both Player 3 and Player 4 envy Player 2, and Player 2 feels tied with
Player 1 (who remains non-envious). We must compensate Player 3 and Player
4 by giving them both additional discounts of 5. Adding 5 to both columns 3
and 4, we obtain Table 4.



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