730
C.-J. Haake et al.
Table 1. Players’ bids for bundles
Bi |
B2 |
B3 |
______B4 | |
P1 |
[50 |
20 |
10 |
20 |
P2 |
60 |
∣^40 |
15 |
10 |
P3 |
0 |
40 |
[25 |
35 |
P4 |
50 |
35 |
10 |
[30 |
Initial payment |
50 |
40 |
25 |
30 |
Table 2. The initial assessment matrix
P1 |
P2 |
P3 |
P4 | |
P1 |
0 |
-20 |
-15 |
-10 |
P2 |
10 |
0 |
-10 |
-20 |
P3 |
-50 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
P4 |
0 |
-5 |
-15 |
0 |
Discounts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Table 3. The modified assessment matrix
P1 |
P2 |
P3 |
P4 | |
P1 |
0 |
-10 |
-10 |
-10 |
P2 |
10 |
10 |
-5 |
-20 |
P3 |
-50 |
10 |
5 |
5 |
P4 |
0 |
5 |
-10 |
0 |
Discounts |
0 |
10 |
5 |
0 |
the diagonal entry from each column. In Table 2, row i then shows Player
i ’s assessment of Player j’s bundle. We keep track of discounts in a separate
row.
The assessment matrix in Table 2 shows (by comparing entries in each
row) that Player 2 envies Player 1 (a22 < a21) and Player 3 envies Player 4
(a33 < a34). Therefore we must compensate Player 2 by giving her a discount
of 10, and Player 3 a discount of 5. To recalculate the assessment matrix, we
may add 10 to column 2 and add 5 to column 3. The new assessment matrix
is given in Table 3.
Now both Player 3 and Player 4 envy Player 2, and Player 2 feels tied with
Player 1 (who remains non-envious). We must compensate Player 3 and Player
4 by giving them both additional discounts of 5. Adding 5 to both columns 3
and 4, we obtain Table 4.
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