DURABLE CONSUMPTION AS A STATUS GOOD: A STUDY OF NEOCLASSICAL CASES



да __ 1 ∂c _ 1 ду _ _ 41)(1+ β + δ) Fkk Fl{y∕l') > θ

(2.18b)


∂η δ∂η δ∂η            (1 + δ)l

= _ Fki дУ_ _ F (1) δ (1+ β + δ) FkiFi o д (y∕Q _ дк=0

∂η    Fkk ∂η         (1 + δ∆                   ∂η ∂η ,

(2.18с)

where13

_ (β + δ) δV"Fkk(1+ β + δ) Fi [7 [(1 + δ)h]-(1+γ) +        21 Fkk(y∕y) > 0.

(1 + δ)a2

The signs of the expressions in (2.18a)-(2.18c) can be directly explained: a higher weight on
status considerations causes consumer-producers to place a greater value on consumption
at the expense of leisure, which is re
flected in (2.18a) in the higher long-run levels of μ and
<y. This leads, in turn, to an increase in work e
ffort y, which, since Fki > 0, causes physical
capital y to accumulate. Nevertheless, the steady-state capital-labor ratio y, determined by
the rate of time preference
β and the curvature of the production function, is independent,
according to (2.18c), of changes in the status preference parameter
η. The long-run rise
in output у leads, as indicated in (2.18b), to an increase in durable consumption c and its
steady-state stock
a. Our results represent, then, an extension of those of Fisher and Hof
(2000b), who in their model non-durable consumption show that “status consciousness”
leads to “too much” consumption, work e
ffort, and physical capital accumulation relative
to a socially planned economy in which status considerations do not play a role.
14

2.2. Fixed Employment Case

In order to explore in greater detail the dynamic properties of the durable consumption
model, we simplify the framework by assuming that employment
fixed. The description
of the
fixed employment version of the model, along with its optimality conditions and

13In calculating (2.18b) and , we have used the fact that (FkkFi Fkiβ) = Fkk (j//ŋ-

14See Fisher and Hof (2000b) proposition 1 and section 4, pp. 10-12. In the context of our model, the
social planner would set
c + a = C + A, implying that (2.17) becomes:

U(c + α,s) = (1 γ)-1 (c + a)1-γ + ηs (1) , γ 0, η > 0.

In this case there is no relative consumption externality arising from status preference.

12



More intriguing information

1. Land Police in Mozambique: Future Perspectives
2. The name is absent
3. Momentum in Australian Stock Returns: An Update
4. WP RR 17 - Industrial relations in the transport sector in the Netherlands
5. CREDIT SCORING, LOAN PRICING, AND FARM BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
6. Regional science policy and the growth of knowledge megacentres in bioscience clusters
7. Indirect Effects of Pesticide Regulation and the Food Quality Protection Act
8. Dementia Care Mapping and Patient-Centred Care in Australian residential homes: An economic evaluation of the CARE Study, CHERE Working Paper 2008/4
9. A Unified Model For Developmental Robotics
10. The Distribution of Income of Self-employed, Entrepreneurs and Professions as Revealed from Micro Income Tax Statistics in Germany
11. Regional differentiation in the Russian federation: A cluster-based typification
12. Qualification-Mismatch and Long-Term Unemployment in a Growth-Matching Model
13. MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ON VIRGINIA DAIRY FARMS
14. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FARM PRICE AND INCOME POLICY PROGRAMS: PART I. SITUATION AND PROBLEM
15. The name is absent
16. The name is absent
17. The Impact of Minimum Wages on Wage Inequality and Employment in the Formal and Informal Sector in Costa Rica
18. Mergers under endogenous minimum quality standard: a note
19. Accurate, fast and stable denoising source separation algorithms
20. The name is absent