Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firms: An Empirical Analysis

Table 1: CEO Ownership

This table reports the number of firms in which the CEO owns more than a specific cutoff of the firms outstanding
stocks. The respective cutoffs for managerial ownership are given in the first column. The number of all firms in
our dataset in the respective year are reported in the ’total’ rows. Panel A provides information for all S&P 500
sample firms for each year from 1992 to 2003. Panel B provides information for all S&P 3500 sample firms for
each year from 1994 to 2003.

Panei A: S&P 500 index

w Cl	Year shown	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
	total	478	488	488	485	490	490	487	494	489	495	498	499
	>0%	96	129	137	109	107	116	121	140	157	159	159	168
	>5%	33	39	37	38	37	41	42	47	45	43	37	35
	>10%	19	22	23	24	25	28	30	32	30	30	24	19
	>15%	11	13	14	15	15	16	18	16	13	14	11	9
	>20%	9	8	7	10	9	8	9	8	6	5	5	4
	>25%	3	3	2	2	1	2	3	2	3	3	4	3
	>30%	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	4	1
	>50%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Panel B: S&P		1500 Index
	total			1,468	1,462	1,472	1,452	1,451	1,452	1,463	1,480	1,479	1,455
	>0%			798	760	755	748	744	801	856	825	868	864
	>5%			295	279	261	254	256	270	261	232	217	195
	>10%			187	177	164	159	163	174	165	143	131	117
	>15%			114	109	100	101	105	113	102	87	78	69
	>20%			77	81	67	64	64	71	68	57	50	43
	>25%			49	47	39	41	41	51	46	36	33	27
	>30%			26	26	26	27	29	32	25	22	20	18
	>50%			3	3	2	2	0	1	2	0	3	3

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Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firms: An Empirical Analysis

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